Wednesday, November 26, 2008

GRAPH-ic Total Recap - Supreme Court's 2007-08 Term: The Defining Decisions (Discrimination+Cultural Issues+Law & Order+Political Process)

This post takes all the data from the previous posts in this series and combines them into one graph. All the "defining decisions" from the Supreme Court's last term--the rulings and the votes in selected cases involving discrimination claims, "cultural issues," law & order, and the political process--are recapped in a single graph that depicts the justices' respective positions on the Court's ideological spectrum. Not surprisingly, that spectrum is wide and clear. That is, at least with regard to which justices' voting records place them at the ends of the spectrum, and which fall closer to the Court's center.

[The previous posts on the New York Court Watcher examined the four identified categories of defining decisions and provided graph-ic recaps along the way. See Supreme Court's 2007-08 Term: The Defining Decisions (Part 4: Political Process), Nov. 8, 2008; Another GRAPH-ic Recap - Supreme Court's 2007-08 Term: The Defining Decisions (Discrimination+Cultural Issues+Law & Order), Oct. 24, 2008; (Part 3: Law & Order [nifty graph included!]), Oct. 14, 2008; GRAPH-ic Recap - Supreme Court's 2007-08 Term: The Defining Decisions (Parts 1 & 2 Recap in Graphs: Discrimination & Cultural Issues), September 24, 2008; (Part 2: Cultural Issues), September 20, 2008; (Part 1: Discrimination), September 16, 2008.]

Here's the graph-ic culmination of all those previous posts:
GRAPH 1: Recap
Discrimination + Cultural Issues + Law & Order + Political Process Decisions
(click to enlarge)
OK, so what's clear? Some things are clear simply by looking at the graph. Some by also recalling the graphs and a bit of the discussion in the previous posts.

First, as for the Court as a whole, the record is quite balanced between liberal and conservative decisions. That might be unexpected. But the explanation here is the Court's record in the discrimination cases included in the "defining decisions." The Court rendered "liberal" decisions--i.e., it sided with the party complaining about race or age discrimination--in every one of those cases. That tempered the Court's otherwise fairly conservative record.

Second, both ends of the Court's ideological spectrum are unmistakable. At one end, Ginsburg and Souter both have strongly liberal voting records--almost perfectly so--in each of the four categories of cases. Ditto for Thomas and Scalia at the conservative end.

Third, Breyer and Stevens have voting records which place them firmly on the liberal side of the Court, but not quite at the far end with Ginsburg and Souter. Breyer broke with the liberals several times on law and order, as well as in one political process case. Stevens broke with the liberals even more frequently on law and order, as well in the cultural issues cases.

Fourth, Roberts and Alito are firmly within the Court's conservative wing. Both of them, however, sided with the liberals in every discrimination case, and Roberts did likewise on some law and order issues.

Fifth, Kennedy in the middle. He was with the liberals in every discrimination case. His votes were evenly split on the cultural issues. His record on law and order leans conservative, and on political process issues even more so.

There you go. A neat little nutshell. It's not all there, of course. That would take a lot more than a few brief posts (ok, not always so brief) and graphs (however "nifty" and telling). But it certainly gives a bird's eye view.

That our Court. That's what we've got. Let's see if Obama's election precipitates some retirements. And then all the fascination and fun of speculating about his possible appointees and of watching the nomination hearings and other developments. Great stuff for Court junkies. And extremely important stuff for all of us.

Wednesday, November 19, 2008

New York Court of Appeals: A "Dream Team" of Retirees

It might have been evident from my past criticisms (OK, rantings) about that moronic mandatory age retirement for Court of Appeals judges. (See, e.g., previous posts on the New York Court Watcher: New York Court of Appeals: Memo to the Governor & the Commission, Nov. 17, 2008; New York Court of Appeals: The Best of Judith Kaye (Part 1), Sept. 26, 2008.)

But a dear friend simply put it together for me in a phone call today. [Suffice it to say that this person--no, I'm not even disclosing the gender--is a former fellow law clerk at the court and ever since a prominent attorney. Also, this person would make a great appointee to the court.]

What this friend suggested outright was a Court of Appeals with the recently age-forced retirees still serving. Wow! Now that would be one heck of a strong court. And let's include Chief Judge Kaye who's being forced out by age in a few weeks.

So just imagine a Court of Appeals with those judges whose only reason for no longer being on the court is that idiotic mandatory retirement:
Judith Kaye
Albert Rosenblatt
Howard Levine
Richard Simons
Stewart Hancock.

That is one heck of a line-up! What an exceptional court that would be with those five. And especially so because of the wisdom and experience they had gained on the court, and in life, by the time they turned 70--let alone the enormous talent, ability and character they had each demonstrated throughout their tenures on the court.

Now there may be some who look closely at that list and wonder why I, a liberal Democrat [not an entirely inaccurate characterization], would actually want four out of five upstate Republicans. And other than Kaye, that is what they all are. But that gets to the very point.

These were superb judges. Exceptionally good, decent, wise, smart, skillful. Not too right or too left. Temperate and collegial, but also independent and gutsy. All extremely well regarded both inside the courthouse on Eagle Street and on the outside by those who follow the court. All made a significant positive impact on the fundamental law of New York. And all would still be doing that, and our court would be pretty exceptional, if it weren't for that imbecilic (ah, went from moronic to idiotic to imbecilic!) mandatory age retirement.

Monday, November 17, 2008

New York Court of Appeals: Memo to the Governor & the Commission

With the imminent retirement of Chief Judge Judith Kaye and the process of selecting a successor in full swing, may I humbly (OK, not so humbly) offer a few observations and suggestions. These apply to the coming vacancy on the court and to future ones as well.

First, mandatory age retirement. If it was not clear previously, it should be now. This forced retirement of Court of Appeals judges, solely because they've reached the statutorily deemed senility of age 70, must be repealed. Is there any sentient human being who knows Chief Judge Kaye and believes that her decisionmaking or leadership skills have now dwindled because of age? Indeed, those who are familiar with her and her work know that she is actually better and stronger and wiser than ever and is actually just starting to reach her prime as a jurist. Agree with her positions on various issues or not, it is the sheerest nonsense to deem her to be judicially diminished because she turned 70 this year.

The same was true for other superb judges which we lost in recent years because of the moronic mandatory age retirement: Albert Rosenblatt, Howard Levine, Richard Simons, and Stewart Hancock to name a few. They too were forced to retire while in their judicial prime.
Contrast that with the judicial longevity of some of the greatest Justices on the Supreme Court: John Marshall served till he was 80 [and that was nearly 2 centuries ago], Oliver Wendell Holmes till 91, Louis Brandeis till 83, Hugo Black till 85, William Brennan till 84, Thurgood Marshall till 83, Lewis Powell till 80, William Rehnquist till 81...There are others, but the point should be clear.

This mandatory retirement age of 70 has to go. Please do what you can to get rid of it. [BTW, this would not affect the Governor's option of simply not reappointing a judge at the end of his or her 14 year term.]

Second, the stature of the court. Let's just be honest. The Court of Appeals is not what it used to be. For a long time it was one of the very finest and most influential courts in America. It was second, if at all, to the U.S. Supreme Court. No serious and candid observer of the court would make such a claim today. Indeed, in a recent study, the court just barely made the top ten of state courts.

Ironically, the court was much stronger when the judges ran for election. That system produced the courts led by Cardozo, Pound, Lehman, Desmond, Fuld, and Breitel. Come on, we just don't have a court like those. The blame is not necessarily the current "merit" appointment system. It may well not make much difference whether selection is by party leaders, the voters, or the Nomination Commission and Governor. But it certainly does make a huge difference whether the selecting authority actually cares about choosing great judges and having a great court. Under our current appointment system, we need both the Commission and the Governor to really care. To make that an unconditional top priority.

Third, appointing a great judge and making a great court. If the will is there, it's not that difficult. There is no mystery here. There's more legal talent in New York than anywhere on the planet. And though there's rarely universal agreement about the single best possible next appointee [That happened once for the Court of Appeals and once for the Supreme Court--yes, the same gentle Ben.], still, those potential appointees who are truly the most exceptional are usually quite readily recognizable and distinguishable from the rest. Some individuals and some qualifications simply stand out.

Take for example the Supreme Court of Arizona. [Just happens to be one of the courts I like to watch.] The justices of that court are selected by an appointment system somewhat similar to New York's. But the results in Arizona are striking. Strikingly good that is. Three of that court's five members were law clerks for justices on the United States Supreme Court. Now that is hardly a required qualification for a great state judge, or a guarantee of one. But it is unquestionably an indication of exceptional ability.

There is no one on the Court of Appeals with that experience. Ok, so what. But neither is there anyone who was a law clerk to a Court of Appeals judge. [Yes, I'm partial, because I clerked at the court.] Now that's no more a requirement for excellence any more than clerking at the Supreme Court. But that's not the point. What is the point is that there is a large pool of potential Court of Appeals appointees who would make very strong judges--surely a larger pool than in Arizona. And that's true even if that pool were limited to former Court of Appeals law clerks.

[In fact, there are two who work with the commission: Stephen Younger, the counsel, and John Halloran, the deputy counsel. Two extraordinarily capable lawyers who would make extraordinary appointees to the court.
And there are other former Court of Appeals clerks--even if limited to those with whom I worked during my six years at the court--who would be exceptionally strong judges. A former president of the state bar association, the current counsel to the state attorney general, some colleagues at Albany Law...... I'll bet we could each come up with a "dream team" Court of Appeals composed of former clerks. No, I'm out. I'd critique their work.
The only point here is--not to fill the court with former clerks, but--that there is plenty to choose from in New York to make a great court.]

Of course, considerations of politics, geography, philosophy, diversity, and other criteria have and will always play a part in judicial selection. Understood. But with the vast pool of great legal talent in this state, there is absolutely no excuse to sacrifice the most imperative consideration--great judges to make a great court.

Fourth, understanding the judicial process. Please, this should be the bare minimum for anyone seriously considered for the court. Or for the commission. (It should also be for the members of the senate judiciary committee. But that committe is a whole 'nother subject.) Potential court appointees and commission members should have some appreciation of the nature of the judicial role beyond the typically trumpeted blandishments: judges must be fair, impartial, neutral, honest, ethical, knowledgable, above reproach, able to get along with colleagues, discreet, avoid conflicts, etc. etc. etc. Fine. But what about some understanding of how judges decide cases? Actually decide cases? About the qualities and abilities that are essential to performing that function well? About their philosophy of judging and how the judiciary fits in our tripartite form of government?

And I do not mean the grade school recitation of, "the legislature makes the laws, the executive enforces the laws, and the judiciary applies the laws." What I do mean is something beyond the simplicity we all learned in 4th or 5th grade social studies, and what we hear from politicians taking cheap or ignorant shots against judges and courts while on the stump.

In fact, any potential appointee to the court or to the commission who utters the nonsensical "judges should just apply the law, not make it" should be sent home packing. Maybe even with a copy of Holmes or Cardozo or another of this country's greatest judges who understood that judges unavoidably and necessarily make law. That judge-made law is a given. That, to be sure, judging and legislating are different. But judges--especially appellate judges--do make law no less than legislators.

And this couldn't be more important. It is only with some understanding of the essential nature of the judicial function that a commission member can intelligently identify applicants who truly are highly qualified to serve on the court. And, a fortiori, only applicants for the court with that minimal understanding should even be considered for appointment.

Fifth, prior judicial experience. It's way overrated. The most difficult and consequential issues decided by the Court of Appeals--like the Supreme Court--are about fundamental policy and principles. They are about freedom and authority, society and the individual, government power and civil liberty, the underlying propositions that govern relations between citizens, and the like. They are about balancing competing interests, reconciling conflicting rules, making current sense of old principles. These are not legalistic questions. They do not call for the skills of a trial judge. And they do entail the burden, not borne by intermediate appeals judges, of rendering final resolution of unsettled questions. They require wisdom, perspective, an understanding of free and equal government; some sense of history, economics and political theory certainly help.

Felix Frankfurter said that the relevance of prior judicial experience to qualification to be on the Supreme Court is "zero". He said so for the same reasons I've outlined above for the Court of Appeals. But even if the relevance is not zero, it's not much more than that. Among recent Court of Appeals judges, Judith Kaye and Hugh Jones had no prior judicial experience. Now that's not too bad. [The more recently appointed Robert Smith had no prior judicial experience either. We're still keeping tabs on him!] In fact, some of the finest jurists to serve on the Supreme Court had absolutely no judicial experience before they were appointed--e.g., Louis Brandeis, Hugo Black, Robert Jackson, Felix Frankfurter, Lewis Powell, Earl Warren, and William Rehnquist.

So there's no good reason to pass up a highly qualified potential appointee solely because she or he has not previously been a judge. And besides everything else, there are so many exceptional lawyers in New York who would make exceptional Court of Appeals judges. Of course, there are some great potential appointees who ARE currently judges. The only point is that judicial experience should not be too weighty a factor.

Sixth, lots more but this post is long enough. So, good wishes, members of the commission and Governor Paterson. Be well and do well. Nothing less than the fundamental law of New York is at stake.

Saturday, November 15, 2008

New York Court of Appeals: And the Next Chief Judge Will Be...

Very reliable sources with inside information are certain who the next Chief Judge will be. I have heard from some of them directly, some indirectly. It's apparently a sure bet who will be on the nominating commission's list and then be selected by Governor David Paterson.

Unfortunately, the reliable sources don't agree. They are making different predictions. Some names are mentioned more frequently than others. But each has been mentioned by at least one reliable source with considerable confidence.

Here are the various "sure bets":

Judge Theodore Jones - currently on the Court of Appeals; its junior member, having been appointed by Governor Spitzer in 2007.

He is well-liked and respected within the court; he has administrative experience as the former Administrative Judge of the civil term of state supreme court in Brooklyn; he is a liberal Democrat like the Governor; and his appointment would be historic as the first African-American Chief Judge in the state's history.

Judge Carmen Ciparick - on the court since 1994, she is currently its senior associate judge and, together with Chief Judge Kaye, all that remains of the Governor Cuomo-appointees.

She is liked, indeed loved, by her colleagues and apparently everyone who has worked with or for her; she is a liberal Democrat; she is the court's first Hispanic judge [No, Benjamin Cardozo is not considered Hispanic, but Portuguese.]; her appointment would be historic as the first Hispanic Chief Judge [No, again, regarding Cardozo.]; and supposedly her appointment would be a way to placate the three rebellious Hispanic Democratic state senators from New York City who are threatening to break from the Democratic caucus. [But these senators are reportedly opposed to the Dems' support for same-sex marriage, and Ciparick voted for it when the issue was at the court in Hernandez v. Robles.]

Presiding Justice Jonathan Lippman - on the Appellate Division, First Department since his appointment as PJ by Governor Spitzer in 2007.

A member of the state's judiciary since his appointment to the Court of Claims by Governor Pataki in 1995, his time has largely been spent on administration rather than adjudication; he served under Chief Judge Kaye as the Chief Administrative Judge of the state's courts from January 1996 to May 2007; he thus has considerable experience as an administrator and perhaps unequalled knowledge of the state court system; and he enjoys a reputation for being smart and skilled.
But, it is now a very long tradition that the Chief Judge comes from within the court. It has been over a century since someone from outside the court became Chief Judge; the last was Alton Parker in 1898.

O. Peter Sherwood - on the Court of Claims, appointed by Governor Paterson in April 2008, and currently serving as an acting justice of state supreme court in Manhattan.

A former state Solicitor General, then New York City's Corporation Counsel, then partner in Manatt, Phelps & Phillips in New York from 1994 until his judicial appointment earlier this year; his judicial decision-making experience is extremely thin; on the other hand his experience litigating cases before the Court of Appeals and other appeals courts, and, in general, his experience with the kinds of difficult and consequential cases that come before the Court of Appeals is vast; and his appointment (like that of Jones) would be historic as the first African-American Chief Judge in New York's history.
But, (as with Lippman) it is now a very long tradition that the Chief Judge comes from within the court. It has been over a century since someone from outside the court became Chief Judge; the last was Alton Parker in 1898.

So these are the "sure bets", each of which some reliable source says will be the next Chief Judge.

Friday, November 14, 2008

Alito v. Scalia: Practical Considerations

Guest Post Contributed by Amy Ottaviano,
Albany Law School student and research assistant to Vin Bonventre

For the past few months, working with Professor B., I have been researching the last three terms of the United States Supreme Court. Looking at cases in which Justices Antonin Scalia and Samuel Alito had written or joined different opinions, I focused on the differences in Scalia’s and Alito’s methods of analyses. I found several.

Among the more interesting are these:
(1) The two justices treat text differently. Usually, whereas Scalia prefers to interpret statutes based on a narrow reading of plain text, Alito prefers broader readings that consider the congressional intent underlying the laws. Alito frequently looks to statutory construction, context, and the practical considerations of the law. Some examples of this difference are found in Winkelman v. Parma City School District (2007), Gomez-Perez v. Potter (2008), and CBOCS v. Humphries (2008).

(2) Related to point # 1, Justice Alito does consider practical implications, while Justice Scalia is often more tied to the plain text such that he blindly disregards them. A good example of this is in LaRue v. DeWolff (2007). There, Alito looked beyond the plain language of a statute which established regulations for federal employee retirement plans. Specifically, when the statute was enacted, federal employees were all enrolled in one kind of plan (“defined benefit”), but by the time this case arose, most were enrolled in a different kind of plan ("defined contribution”). Rather than disregard this development, Alito argued that it was more practical to give effect to the overriding congressional intent behind the law as it would apply under the changed circumstances. Scalia ultimately reached the same result in the case as Alito, but he did so in a separate opinion by drawing somewhat unpersuasive comparisons between the two types of retirement plans and insisting that his conclusion rested on the plain text.

Another noteworthy example is Indiana v. Edwards (2007). There, Scalia adamantly supported the right of a criminal defendant to refuse counsel, even where he was deemed mentally incompetent to stand trial without an attorney. Scalia ignored the practical consideration that the criminal defendant was simply incapable of mounting an effective defense without the assistance of counsel. Once again, taking practicality into consideration, Alito joined the opposing opinion that the right to self representation is meaningless if the defendant is incapable of meaningfully representing himself; that an unconditional enforcement of the pro se right does not serve the 6th Amendment’s purpose. [Other examples of the difference in the consideration of practicality may be found in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez; Burlington v. White (2006); and Begay v. United States (2008).]

Certainly, there are more differences between these justices than the two discussed, and certainly there are many similarities. However, it seems from my research that when Scalia and Alito do disagree, it is often for the reasons discussed here.

Amy Ottaviano, Albany Law School, Class of 2010

[For additional discussion comparing the voting and opinions of Alito and Scalia, see previous posts on the New York Court Watcher: Not Exactly "Scalito", June 12, 2008; Not Exactly "Scalito" (Part 2), June 22, 2008; and Well, Not Exactly NOT "Scalito" Either, Aug.12, 2008.]

Saturday, November 8, 2008

Supreme Court's 2007-08 Term: The Defining Decisions (Part 4: Political Process)

With the election this past week, it could not be more appropriate to now consider the "political process" decisions--the last of the decisions that we've (ok, I've) deemed to be "defining" of the Court's last term. The three in this final category all pertain to elections. They involve voting, nominating, and campaign spending.

[For previous discussions on the New York Court Watcher about other categories of last term's defining decisions, see
Another GRAPH-ic Recap - Supreme Court's 2007-08 Term: The Defining Decisions (Discrimination+Cultural Issues+Law & Order), Oct. 24, 2008; Supreme Court's 2007-08 Term: The Defining Decisions (Part 3: Law & Order [nifty graph included!]), Oct. 14, 2008; GRAPH-ic Recap - Supreme Court's 2007-08 Term: The Defining Decisions (Parts 1 & 2 Recap in Graphs: Discrimination & Cultural Issues), September 24, 2008; (Part 2: Cultural Issues), September 20, 2008; (Part 1: Discrimination), September 16, 2008.]

Wednesday, November 5, 2008

Obama and the Court

One of the most enduring powers a President exercises is the nomination of Justices to the Supreme Court. As lifetime appointees, Justices typically remain on the Court long after the Presidents who selected them are gone from office. And in deciding the most fundamental questions about freedom and authority in our republic, the influence these Justices have on the values, direction and history of the nation oftentimes surpasses that of the Presidents who were responsible for putting them on the Court in the first place.

President-elect Barack Obama may well get the opportunity to exercise the appointment power before too long. It is likely that one or more Justices will retire within the first few years after Obama takes the oath of office. In replacing those retiring Justices with his own selections, the new President will put his own mark on the Court and, ultimately, affect the philosophical and jurisprudential character of the Court's decisions.

Although he was just elected last night, it's certainly not too early to consider which Justices might be retiring--i.e, the Justices President Obama might be replacing, the ones who might give him the opportunity to remake the Court. Here they are in some rough order of the liklihood of their retiring:

John Paul Stevens--appointed by Ford in 1975; liberal [age 88; certainly wants a Democratic President to choose his successor]
Ruth Bader Ginsburg--appointed by Clinton in 1993; liberal [age 75; has had health problems; certainly wants a Democratic President to choose her successor]
David Souter--appointed by Bush (41) in 1990; liberal [relatively young, 69, but reportedly is not particularly happy; certainly wants a Democratic President to choose his successor]

The rest:
Anthony Kennedy--appointed by Reagan in 1988; moderately conservative [not particularly old, 72; unlikely to want to leave his strategic position as the Court's swing vote]
Stephen Breyer--appointed by Clinton in 1994; liberal [not particularly old, 70; no suggestion he'd like to leave any time soon; but certainly would want a Democratic President to choose his successor]
Antonin Scalia--appointed by Reagan in 1986; conservative [not particularly old, 72; very unlikely to leave with a Democratic President to choose his successor]
Clarence Thomas--appointed by Bush (41) in 1991; conservative [relatively young, 60; not particularly happy, but very unlikely to leave soon, esp. with a Democratic President]
John Roberts--appointed by Bush (43) in 2005; conservative [young, 53; newly appointed; unlikely to leave with a Democratic President]
Samuel Alito--appointed by Bush (43) in 2006; conservative [young, 58; newly appointed; unlikely to leave with a Democratic President]

In short, the most likely to retire are Stevens, Ginsburg and Souter. All are liberals. So President Obama is likely going to be replacing only liberals, not conservatives [at least in his first term]. And replacing these liberals with liberals--which is almost certainly what President Obama would do--will NOT do much to affect the ideological composition of the Court.

On the other hand, if an Obama appointee is especially adept socially, politically, and intellectually in influencing colleagues--for example, as William Brennan was according to most accounts--than that appointee might well make a difference. Such a liberal Obama appointee, though simply replacing another liberal, might well alter the ideological dynamics within the Court.

As for all and any of this, we shall see. And perhaps sooner than later.