[Prior to the December 10, 2009 post, "Pellucidly Clear"--at the Supreme Court, the NY Court of Appeals, & Elsewhere (An Impressive & Fascinating Pedigree), I innocently asked a reader of New York Court Watcher if he was familiar with "pellucidly clear," and what he thought about its use in judicial opinions or blogs or any other venue. I thought it well worth sharing his response. So here it is as a guest post.]
In all seriousness, I love it. First, I don’t necessarily view it as a “literal redundancy”; there’s clear, and then there’s CLEAR, if you know what I mean.
Second, the word itself, “pellucid,” is quite lovely. It <*AHEM*> “conjures up” images of the still crystal waters of a highland loch … a low mist rolling like captured cumulus clouds across those waters, just as dawn begins to break through the thin veil of just a few actual clouds, high above … and then, ever-so-slowly, a sword—no; strike that—a Sword begins to emerge, silently and utterly smoothly, “breaking”-yet-not breaking the surface of the loch. And then we see a hand, gripping the hilt of the Sword—which, of course, is none other than mighty Excalibur itself, Blade of Legend, and a weapon most-badass!—and then an arm emerges—slender, beautiful, skin practically translucent—that of the Lady of the Lake….
Sorry … what were we talking about? I’m actually quite fond of Arthurian legends and mythology, BTW. Is that something you knew about me, by any chance?
Anyway, finally, I’m very fond—generally, and certainly in this case—of the use of an adverb-in-form as an adjective; it somehow adds a pleasing and/or interesting “lilt” (yet p’raps that’s nae more than me Welsh ‘eritage shewyng).
So—in sum, at bottom, all kidding aside—I say: go for it! Indeed, even if it is a “redundancy,” in some small, stingy literal (or, what’s the word you like? … Ah! “formalistic”) sense, so what??
Again, I say – so what?? Strike boldly, man, and let sound a mighty chord, in the very key of redundancy. And let it resound, mellifluously (if a trifle floridly…), across this great and proud land of ours, where – Yes! – a lone individual (who merely happens to be a tenured law professor with several advanced degrees and a distinguished background that includes both military and government service) may certainly discuss—in no less public and noteworthy a medium than the rarefied pages of a blog on legal (or, more particularly, judicial) writing—the finer points of grammatical usages in such writings, without fear of hooded, jackbooted, drone-like agents of the status quo—the very “Establishment,” itself—kicking down his doors in the middle of the night!
And when, in the end, you have been “disappeared” and spirited off to some dank cell in Egypt, or Gitmo, or wherever … and your name and memory have been erased from not only the pages, but the very indices, of the history books … and it is a crime not only to speak—but even to think—your name, I, for one, sir, will not forget, but rather will mourn you … and remember you—often and fondly—as one of the Last Great American Heroes and Thought Leaders of consciously non-utilitarian grammatical phrasing in the context of academic analyses of certain discrete instances of judicial decisional writing.
But, just to be “on the same page,” here, if “anybody” (i.e., “The Man”) DOES ask … well then, of course, I never knew you, we never had this conversation, and anybody who says otherwise is a freakin’ LIAR!
There you are, sir! As requested: one heapin’ helping of incisive, insightful, and—one might even say—somewhat brilliant analysis, with a side order of irony, and just a dusting of freshly ground wit (he said, with nary a hint of hyperbole nor a trace of ego…).
So, does that help??
If not, please forgive my ramblings and digressions, and allow me to be perfectly, plainly, crystallinely, transparently, flawlessly, uncloudedly, and, of course, pellucidly clear: It’s nice, I like it, and I wouldn’t hesitate for an instant to use it—certainly not in the context you outlined.
As always, happy to offer my—perhaps less than direct but, hopefully, nonetheless helpful—perspective, especially on such weighty and substantive matters!
All the best, Demosthenes Locke
Thursday, December 24, 2009
Friday, December 18, 2009
NY Court of Appeals: Granting Criminal Appeals--Up, Down, Now Up Again? (Part 8: Who Was & Wasn't Granting the Previous 5 Years)
GRAPH 1
CLA's Granted by Each COA Judge
Ann. Avg. & Each Year, 2004-08
(click to enlarge)
Graph 1 tells the whole story. Well, the story to be told in this post. That is, the number of CLA's granted by each Court of Appeals Judge in each of the previous 5 years, and each Judge's annual average over that period.
(A less cluttered and more digestible graph [#8] at the end of this post is a veritable nutshell of the highlights. Take a look now if you want to cut to the chase--you know, like going right to the bottom line, or the black-letter law of a case.)
A quick glance at Graph 1 shows the wide range of CLA granting among the Judges. There were a total of 9 Judges who were members of the 7-member Court at some time during the 5 years. (Some were on the Court the entire 5-year period. Others retired during that time, and still others were then appointed to replace them.)
Another quick glance shows that, among the total of 9 Judges, Eugene Pigott granted CLA's at the highest rate. Susan Read at the lowest.
But there's an awful lot of data crowded into that graph. Let's unpack it into more digestible pieces. But first, briefly recall some of what we've seen in earlier posts in this series in the New York Court Watcher. Just to give some quick perspective to what we're discussing here.
GRAPH 2
Total CLA's Granted by COA Judges
Averages, 1988-92 vs. 2004-08
(click to enlarge)
We saw that criminal appeals were being granted by Court of Appeals Judges in recent years at a much lower rate than in the past. Specifically, as depicted in Graph 2, the Judges granted less than half as many CLA's in the most recent 5-year period as they had in an earlier one.
(The most recent, completed 5-year period [2004-2008] happened to be the last 5 years of Chief Judge Judith Kaye's tenure. So the earlier 5-year period chosen for comparison [1988-1992] was the last 5 years of her predecessor's tenure, i.e., Chief Judge Sol Wachtler's.)
We also saw that this sharp contrast was not a mere accident of averages or some atypical happenstance. Rather, there was a clear pattern--or break in patterns--for granting CLA's in recent years versus in the past. This is how it looked.
GRAPH 3
Total CLA's Granted by COA Judges
Annual Number, 1988 to 2008
(Adjusted 1997)
(click to enlarge)
What emerged from the data was one clear pattern up to 1995, and another one thereafter. The CLA's granted each year by Court of Appeals Judges dropped precipitously after 1995. The drop was immediate, substantial, and lasting.
And, well, 1995 just happens to be the year in which then-Governor George Pataki began to publicly castigate the Court for being too liberal, for "coddling criminals," for caring more about criminals than victims. You know the lines.
True or not, the criticisms instigated other politicians and several newspapers to join in a seemingly relentless several months of Court-bashing. True or not, the criticisms were followed by a conservative swing at the Court. The decisions of the Court and the voting of individual Judges became significantly more favorable to the prosecution, less sympathetic to the claims of the accused.
It was at this very same time that the Court of Appeals Judges began to grant fewer criminal appeals. Far fewer. About half as many. That continued through the most recent, completed 5-year period-- the last five years of the Kaye Court, 2004 through 2008.
(Fuller discussions of the foregoing background are available in previous posts on New York Court Watcher. See, e.g., NY Court of Appeals: Granting Criminal Appeals--Up, Down, Now Up Again? (Part 7: Pataki's Attack and The Court's Retreat), Dec. 5, 2009; (Part 6: The 1997 "Blip" & What it Says About the Drop), Dec. 2, 2009; (Part 5: When Did The Grants Drop?), Nov. 30, 2009.)
With that recapped background, let's now return to those most recent, completed 5 years. Let's take a look at a piece of that data-packed Graph 1.
GRAPH 4
CLA's Granted by Each Judge
Each Year, 2004-08
(click to enlarge)
Graph 4 depicts the number of CLA's granted by each Judge on the Court of Appeals for each year of that 5-year period. Although the Judges are ordered in the graph by seniority, it's still clear that a couple of the more junior Judges are the ones that have been granting CLA's at the highest rates: Judges Eugene Pigott and Robert Smith. (Pigott was appointed in late 2006, so only the figures for 2007 & 2008 are included for him. Smith was appointed in early 2004, so all 5 years are included for him.)
Beyond that, however, a clearer picture emerges from a look at the annual averages for the individual Judges, and the comparisons among them. Take a look.
GRAPH 5
CLA's Granted by Each Judge
Ann. Avg., 2004-08
(click to enlarge)
The graphing of annual averages certainly sharpens the contrasts among the Judges. Again, Pigott and Robert Smith granted the most criminal appeals. Just as clearly, and in very sharp contrast, Judges Susan Read and Victoria Graffeo granted the fewest.
If the graph is reorganized to take the Judges out of seniority-order and into order by CLA grants, the Court's spectrum is underscored. Let's see.
GRAPH 6
CLA's Granted by Each Judge
Ann. Avg., 2004-08
(descending order of grants)
(click to enlarge)
As shown in Graph 6, now-retired Judge Albert Rosenblatt and 2007-appointed Judge Theodore Jones granted the most CLA's after Pigott and Robert Smith. In fact, their numbers are quite similar to Smith's.
Also notable, and highlighted by the data rearranged this way, is the real spectrum that exists among the Judges. And the non-partisan, non-ideological (at least non conservative-versus-liberal) character of that spectrum. Pigott and Smith, with the most grants, and Read and Graffeo, with the least, are all appointees of Republican (Court-bashing) Governor George Pataki.
If the graph is restricted to Judges who were still on the Court last year (who, except for Chief Judge Kaye who was required by law to retire at the end of last year, remain on the Court), the result is a more immediately relevant depiction of the data. Here is how the annual averages look with that modification.
GRAPH 7
CLA's Granted by Each 2008 Judge
Ann. Avg., 2004-08
(descending order of grants)
(click to enlarge)
Nothing different of course. But a cleaner, less crowded look at CLA granting by the Judges who were still on the Court through last year.
Interestingly, the Judges in between the 2 extremes--i.e., Theodore Jones, Carmen Ciparick, and Judith Kaye--were all appointed by a Democratic Governor. Indeed, they were the only appointees of Democratic Governors at the time and were the 3 most liberal, or pro-accused, of the 7 Judges. (For a discussion of Kaye, Ciparick, and Jones as the most liberal, pro-accused members of the Court as of last year, see Court of Appeals: What Lippman Inherited (Part 2 - Criminal Law Voting Spectrum), Mar. 19, 2009.)
Finally, let's conclude by simplifying that data-crowded graph this post began with. Let's restrict it to Judges who were still on the Court last year, and to data from the last 2 completed years--i.e., the last 2 years of the 5-year period we've been looking at.
GRAPH 8
CLA's Granted by Each 2008 Judge
Ann. Avg. & Each Year, 2007-08
(descending order of grants)
(click to enlarge)
So this was the state of affairs with CLA grants among the Court of Appeals Judges at the end of last year. Looking at the last 2 completed years, 2007 and 2008, gives a good idea of the very recent CLA granting rates of the Judges.
In fact, it gives a good look at what the new Chief Judge, Jonathan Lippman, inherited upon his appointment to the Court's center seat in February of this year. Minus, his predecessor, Judith Kaye, this is the status of CLA grants by his new colleagues.
Some Judges, namely Pigott and Smith, were granting several times as many CLA's as Read, and twice as many as Kaye and Graffeo. The new Chief Judge could have done nothing about the disparity. Or he could have sought to lower Pigott's and Smith's numbers. Or raise Read's and Graffeo's. Or moderate all the Judges to the numbers of Jones and Ciparick.
In the next post in this series, we'll take a look at what Lippman actually did. Or at least what has happened with CLA grants since Lippman took the helm at New York's highest court.
CLA's Granted by Each COA Judge
Ann. Avg. & Each Year, 2004-08
(click to enlarge)
Graph 1 tells the whole story. Well, the story to be told in this post. That is, the number of CLA's granted by each Court of Appeals Judge in each of the previous 5 years, and each Judge's annual average over that period.
(A less cluttered and more digestible graph [#8] at the end of this post is a veritable nutshell of the highlights. Take a look now if you want to cut to the chase--you know, like going right to the bottom line, or the black-letter law of a case.)
A quick glance at Graph 1 shows the wide range of CLA granting among the Judges. There were a total of 9 Judges who were members of the 7-member Court at some time during the 5 years. (Some were on the Court the entire 5-year period. Others retired during that time, and still others were then appointed to replace them.)
Another quick glance shows that, among the total of 9 Judges, Eugene Pigott granted CLA's at the highest rate. Susan Read at the lowest.
But there's an awful lot of data crowded into that graph. Let's unpack it into more digestible pieces. But first, briefly recall some of what we've seen in earlier posts in this series in the New York Court Watcher. Just to give some quick perspective to what we're discussing here.
GRAPH 2
Total CLA's Granted by COA Judges
Averages, 1988-92 vs. 2004-08
(click to enlarge)
We saw that criminal appeals were being granted by Court of Appeals Judges in recent years at a much lower rate than in the past. Specifically, as depicted in Graph 2, the Judges granted less than half as many CLA's in the most recent 5-year period as they had in an earlier one.
(The most recent, completed 5-year period [2004-2008] happened to be the last 5 years of Chief Judge Judith Kaye's tenure. So the earlier 5-year period chosen for comparison [1988-1992] was the last 5 years of her predecessor's tenure, i.e., Chief Judge Sol Wachtler's.)
We also saw that this sharp contrast was not a mere accident of averages or some atypical happenstance. Rather, there was a clear pattern--or break in patterns--for granting CLA's in recent years versus in the past. This is how it looked.
GRAPH 3
Total CLA's Granted by COA Judges
Annual Number, 1988 to 2008
(Adjusted 1997)
(click to enlarge)
What emerged from the data was one clear pattern up to 1995, and another one thereafter. The CLA's granted each year by Court of Appeals Judges dropped precipitously after 1995. The drop was immediate, substantial, and lasting.
And, well, 1995 just happens to be the year in which then-Governor George Pataki began to publicly castigate the Court for being too liberal, for "coddling criminals," for caring more about criminals than victims. You know the lines.
True or not, the criticisms instigated other politicians and several newspapers to join in a seemingly relentless several months of Court-bashing. True or not, the criticisms were followed by a conservative swing at the Court. The decisions of the Court and the voting of individual Judges became significantly more favorable to the prosecution, less sympathetic to the claims of the accused.
It was at this very same time that the Court of Appeals Judges began to grant fewer criminal appeals. Far fewer. About half as many. That continued through the most recent, completed 5-year period-- the last five years of the Kaye Court, 2004 through 2008.
(Fuller discussions of the foregoing background are available in previous posts on New York Court Watcher. See, e.g., NY Court of Appeals: Granting Criminal Appeals--Up, Down, Now Up Again? (Part 7: Pataki's Attack and The Court's Retreat), Dec. 5, 2009; (Part 6: The 1997 "Blip" & What it Says About the Drop), Dec. 2, 2009; (Part 5: When Did The Grants Drop?), Nov. 30, 2009.)
With that recapped background, let's now return to those most recent, completed 5 years. Let's take a look at a piece of that data-packed Graph 1.
GRAPH 4
CLA's Granted by Each Judge
Each Year, 2004-08
(click to enlarge)
Graph 4 depicts the number of CLA's granted by each Judge on the Court of Appeals for each year of that 5-year period. Although the Judges are ordered in the graph by seniority, it's still clear that a couple of the more junior Judges are the ones that have been granting CLA's at the highest rates: Judges Eugene Pigott and Robert Smith. (Pigott was appointed in late 2006, so only the figures for 2007 & 2008 are included for him. Smith was appointed in early 2004, so all 5 years are included for him.)
Beyond that, however, a clearer picture emerges from a look at the annual averages for the individual Judges, and the comparisons among them. Take a look.
GRAPH 5
CLA's Granted by Each Judge
Ann. Avg., 2004-08
(click to enlarge)
The graphing of annual averages certainly sharpens the contrasts among the Judges. Again, Pigott and Robert Smith granted the most criminal appeals. Just as clearly, and in very sharp contrast, Judges Susan Read and Victoria Graffeo granted the fewest.
If the graph is reorganized to take the Judges out of seniority-order and into order by CLA grants, the Court's spectrum is underscored. Let's see.
GRAPH 6
CLA's Granted by Each Judge
Ann. Avg., 2004-08
(descending order of grants)
(click to enlarge)
As shown in Graph 6, now-retired Judge Albert Rosenblatt and 2007-appointed Judge Theodore Jones granted the most CLA's after Pigott and Robert Smith. In fact, their numbers are quite similar to Smith's.
Also notable, and highlighted by the data rearranged this way, is the real spectrum that exists among the Judges. And the non-partisan, non-ideological (at least non conservative-versus-liberal) character of that spectrum. Pigott and Smith, with the most grants, and Read and Graffeo, with the least, are all appointees of Republican (Court-bashing) Governor George Pataki.
If the graph is restricted to Judges who were still on the Court last year (who, except for Chief Judge Kaye who was required by law to retire at the end of last year, remain on the Court), the result is a more immediately relevant depiction of the data. Here is how the annual averages look with that modification.
GRAPH 7
CLA's Granted by Each 2008 Judge
Ann. Avg., 2004-08
(descending order of grants)
(click to enlarge)
Nothing different of course. But a cleaner, less crowded look at CLA granting by the Judges who were still on the Court through last year.
Interestingly, the Judges in between the 2 extremes--i.e., Theodore Jones, Carmen Ciparick, and Judith Kaye--were all appointed by a Democratic Governor. Indeed, they were the only appointees of Democratic Governors at the time and were the 3 most liberal, or pro-accused, of the 7 Judges. (For a discussion of Kaye, Ciparick, and Jones as the most liberal, pro-accused members of the Court as of last year, see Court of Appeals: What Lippman Inherited (Part 2 - Criminal Law Voting Spectrum), Mar. 19, 2009.)
Finally, let's conclude by simplifying that data-crowded graph this post began with. Let's restrict it to Judges who were still on the Court last year, and to data from the last 2 completed years--i.e., the last 2 years of the 5-year period we've been looking at.
GRAPH 8
CLA's Granted by Each 2008 Judge
Ann. Avg. & Each Year, 2007-08
(descending order of grants)
(click to enlarge)
So this was the state of affairs with CLA grants among the Court of Appeals Judges at the end of last year. Looking at the last 2 completed years, 2007 and 2008, gives a good idea of the very recent CLA granting rates of the Judges.
In fact, it gives a good look at what the new Chief Judge, Jonathan Lippman, inherited upon his appointment to the Court's center seat in February of this year. Minus, his predecessor, Judith Kaye, this is the status of CLA grants by his new colleagues.
Some Judges, namely Pigott and Smith, were granting several times as many CLA's as Read, and twice as many as Kaye and Graffeo. The new Chief Judge could have done nothing about the disparity. Or he could have sought to lower Pigott's and Smith's numbers. Or raise Read's and Graffeo's. Or moderate all the Judges to the numbers of Jones and Ciparick.
In the next post in this series, we'll take a look at what Lippman actually did. Or at least what has happened with CLA grants since Lippman took the helm at New York's highest court.
Thursday, December 10, 2009
"Pellucidly Clear"--at the Supreme Court, the NY Court of Appeals, & Elsewhere (An Impressive & Fascinating Pedigree)
Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, New York Chief Judge Judith Kaye, California Supreme Court Justice Stanley Mosk, Federal 2d Circuit Judge Henry Friendly. They used it. "Pellucidly clear," that is.
[As this blog's erudite regular readers undoubtedly know, the phrase in question literally means transparently clearly clear.]
In the last post, I used it. With self-amusement, and self-consciousness. I also recalled having seen it used twice before. Both times in high court decisions. Once by a Judge on New York's highest court while I was clerking there. The other time in a recent Supreme Court opinion.
Sure enough, I plugged "pellucidly clear" into the legal research engines and voila! It was Judge Bernard Meyer in his 1986 opinion for the New York Court of Appeals in People ex rel Robertson v. State Div. of Parole. And it was Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion last year in Baze v. Rees.
Then I broadened the search and what emerged was very interesting. Even fascinating There is quite an impressive judicial pedigree to the use of "pellucidly clear." This felicitous redundancy has an extraordinary list of partisans.
Let's get right to it. First, at the Supreme Court.
GRAPH 1
"Pellucidly Clear" by the Supremes
(click to enlarge)
"Pellucidly clear" appears in 16 cases in Supreme Court history. Its vintage at the Court is quite recent. It was first used in the 1980 decision in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co. Writing the Court's opinion, Justice Stevens said of the issue to be resolved: "The answer to this question is pellucidly clear."
And thus began the Supreme Court's --actually Stevens'--veritable love affair with the phrase. It was Stevens, the leader of the Court's liberal wing, who used it in every one of the 16 cases.
Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court's most outspoken conservative, did use the phrase in one of those cases. He did so in his 2007 dissent in Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Dept. of Educ. But he was only mimicking Stevens who had used the phrase in the majority opinion. So it's clear that Stevens' use was serious, while Scalia's was pellucidly sarcastic.
What about the state supreme courts? Well take a look.
GRAPH 2
"Pellucidly Clear" in the State Supremes
(click to enlarge)
"Pellucidly clear" has been used in 14 decisions by state supreme courts. It's a pretty strong collection of courts. Certainly, the New York Court of Appeals and the California Supreme Court have historically been among the most influential judicial tribunals in the country.
Indeed, there is no little unspoken competition between those 2 as to which has had a greater impact on torts, contracts, criminal investigation and adjudication, and other areas of the law. And in the last several decades, which court has been more a leader in taking an independent course from the rightward direction of the U.S. Supreme Court in constitutional rights and liberties.
In "pellucidly clear"cases, however, New York is the unquestionable leader among state high courts. Its 6 cases are double the number of California's.
On the other hand, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, with just 1 "pellucidly clear" case to its name, is the first state high court to use the phrase. In the 1971 decision in State v. I, A Woman, Justice (later Chief Justice) Nathan Heffernan put one of the issues in the case to rest as follows: "it [is] ‘pellucidly clear’--to quote a favorite phrase of the appellant district attorney--that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." It's also pellucidly clear that the phrase was not one of Heffernan's favorite but, like Scalia years later in Zuni, he was using it for chiding effect.
And who were the other users on the state supreme courts?
GRAPH 3
"Pellucidly Clear" by State Supremes
(click to enlarge)
Again--as with the state courts themselves--this is a pretty strong collection. New York's Judge Meyer, who was mentioned earlier, is the champ here.
He was a brilliant Judge, both on the trial bench and on the Court of Appeals, where he acknowledged himself an avowed activist in trying to do justice. (Unfortunately, his tenure on the high tribunal was cut to a short 7 years by the state's moronic law mandating retirement from the court at age 70. But that's a whole 'nother matter.)
In 2d place is California's Stanley Mosk. One of the nation's most venerable and beloved judges of the past century, his 37 year tenure is the longest in the state Supreme Court's history. Mosk's opinions influenced the development of virtually every area of the law dealt with in America's state courts. He was also an early and persistent influence on the state courts and their justices nationwide in developing state constitutional jurisprudence independent of U.S. Supreme Court case law.
In 3d place on the "pellucidly clear" list is New York's Judith Kaye. In addition to serving as the state's Chief Judge for more than a quarter century--the longest in New York history--Kaye earned a reputation as a scholar, an administrative reformer, one of the nation's leading advocates for independent state constitutional decision-making, and--oh, almost forgot to mention--she was the first woman to sit on the New York Court of Appeals and the first woman Chief Judge. Not surprisingly, Kaye (who was a victim of that moronic state retirement law last year) was one of the nation's most prominent and admired judicial figures in the United States.
Not too shabby for "pellucidly clear" so far, huh?
Now let's check out the U.S. Courts of Appeals--the circuit courts. First, look at the total number of cases in which our fast-becoming favorite phrase was used in those courts.
GRAPH 4
"Pellucidly Clear" in the U.S. Circuit Courts
(click to enlarge)
"Pellucidly clear" has been used by the federal appeals courts in 103 cases. But in no less than 40 of those, the use was actually a direct quote or a reference to Justice Stevens' use of the phrase in Gall v. U.S. (He wrote the majority opinion in that 2007 case dealing with the proper consideration of federal sentencing guidelines--a matter frequently reviewed by the circuit courts.).
That leaves 63 "pellucidly clear" cases not merely parroting Stevens. So how do the individual circuits stack up on these?
Take a look.
GRAPH 5
"Pellucidly Clear" by Circuit Court
(click to enlarge)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit, sitting in Boston, leads the pack. The 4th Circuit in Richmond, Virginia, and the 2d Circuit in New York City complete the top "pellucidly clear" trio.
But the 9th Circuit, sitting in San Francisco, has the distinction of using the phrase first. It also has the distinction of having an extraordinarily distinguished judge use it that time. The case was Johnson v. Gardner, a 1950 bankruptcy appeal. The judge, Paul McCormick, was actually a trial judge in federal district court in southern California. Later in his career, however, he would be asked to sit by designation on the circuit court.
His use of the phrase--that first use in circuit courts--was unexceptional. ("It is pellucidly clear... that the action in the District Court was entirely and essentially one of equit[y]") But he was anything but that. Among this Calvin Coolidge appointee's legacies is his decision in Mendez v. Westminster Sch. Dist. In that 1946 case--a trial over which McCormick presided--he ruled that California's "separate but equal" schools for Mexicans violated constitutional equal protection.
The 9th Circuit affirmed his decision and Governor Earl Warren then signed legislation repealing the state's system of segregated schools. Of course, 8 years after McCormick's ruling in Mendez, the same Earl Warren was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and he wrote the decision in Brown v. Bd. of Ed. ending "separate but equal" for the entire country.
McCormick used "pellucidly clear" only once as a federal appeals judge. So who were the all-time leaders.
GRAPH 6
"Pellucidly Clear" by Federal Appeals Judges
(click to enlarge)
Justice Stevens beats all the circuit judges. But Bruce Selya of the 1st Circuit used "pellucidly clear" in only 1 fewer case. No one else is close.
Having served 20 years on the 1st Circuit, Judge Selya is currently on senior (semi-retired) status. At the same time, however, he is the presiding judge of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review. Considered one of the American judiciary's most erudite writers, he is among a handful of the most cited federal judges.
After Selya comes Per Curiam opinions out of the 5th Circuit, which sits in New Orleans. Most of these 5 unsigned opinions are summary rulings insisting that the court is bound to follow Supreme Court precedent, even if it is "pellucidly clear" that the Supreme Court itself would no longer follow it. (Hardly one of the highlights of the "pellucidly clear" catalogue.)
Then comes Judge Thomas Ellis who used "pellucidly clear" in 4 cases. Like Judge McCormick, Ellis is actually a federal trial judge who is sometimes asked to sit on an appellate court. He has sat on both the 3d Circuit in Philadelphia and on the 4th in Richmond. This trial judge from the the eastern district of Virginia is a former Naval aviator, and in recent years he has presided over some espionage, terrorist, and national security cases that were in national headlines.
Then there's Francis Murnaghan of the 4th Circuit. Prior to his death a few years ago, he was a forceful and widely-admired liberal voice on a court that had become one of the nation's most conservative benches. A prolific writer of dissenting and concurring opinions, he authored hundreds of such separate opinions taking issue with his colleagues.
The remaining 2 judges depicted in the graph--the remaining federal appeals judges who have used "pellucidly clear" more than once, and not just quoting someone else--are widely recognized as 2 of the federal bench's brightest stars. Judge Robert Katzmann of the 2d Circuit is a political scientist (PhD, Harvard) and lawyer (JD, Yale). Prior to his appointment to the 2d Circuit, he was a fellow at the Brookings Institution and a professor of government, law and public policy at Georgetown.
Judge Diane Wood of the 7th Circuit, which sits in Chicago, seems to be on everyone's short-list for the Supreme Court. Her career in academia and government has included a clerkship with Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun, a position as an assistant attorney general in the justice department, professorships at both Georgetown and Chicago (where she was associate dean and still teaches), as well as the authorship of an extensive body of legal scholarship. As a judge on the 7th Circuit, she is viewed as a brilliant liberal counterweight to conservative judicial giants Richard Posner and Frank Estabrook.
Finally, mention must be made of Henry Friendly. Following Judge McCormick's use of the phrase in 1950 [see above], Friendly was next in the 1973 2d Circuit case of Blanton v. S.U.N.Y.
He did use "pellucidly clear" in only one case. But he was the second federal appeals judge to do so, and he was Henry Friendly.
One of the most revered judges to sit on the federal bench, his name was repeated frequently as Chief Justice John Roberts's mentor--the latter having clerked for Friendly. The transparent--better yet, pellucid--purpose being to suggest a favorable comparison.
As one commentator recently wrote in addressing that attempt: "Comparing any judge to Henry Friendly is like comparing any basketball player to Michael Jordan." (Robert Gordon, Slate Magazine.) Or as Justice Felix Frakfurter put it while Friendly was still on the bench: he's "the best judge now writing opinions on the American scene." (Of course, the anything-but-humble Frankfurter had already retired from the Supreme Court, so he was certainly not placing himself below Friendly.)
Following Friendly's death in 1986, Chief Justice Warren Burger said, "I have never known a judge more qualified to sit on the Supreme Court." [Of course, like most of the best, he never made it.] And the esteemed Judge Jon Newman, of Friendly's own 2d Circuit, called him "quite simply the pre-eminent appellate judge of his era."
Yep, that was Henry Friendly. And he used "pellucidly clear." Add to him the other judicial luminaries discussed in this post and you have a veritable pantheon. An extraordinary list of judges who have smiled favorably upon that appealing redundancy.
Stevens, Meyer, Mosk, Kaye, McCormick, Selya, Ellis, Murnaghan, Katzmann, Wood, and Friendly!!
That is some impressive judicial pedigree. And that's good enough reason to go ahead, use "pellucidly clear," and be proud!
[As this blog's erudite regular readers undoubtedly know, the phrase in question literally means transparently clearly clear.]
In the last post, I used it. With self-amusement, and self-consciousness. I also recalled having seen it used twice before. Both times in high court decisions. Once by a Judge on New York's highest court while I was clerking there. The other time in a recent Supreme Court opinion.
Sure enough, I plugged "pellucidly clear" into the legal research engines and voila! It was Judge Bernard Meyer in his 1986 opinion for the New York Court of Appeals in People ex rel Robertson v. State Div. of Parole. And it was Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion last year in Baze v. Rees.
Then I broadened the search and what emerged was very interesting. Even fascinating There is quite an impressive judicial pedigree to the use of "pellucidly clear." This felicitous redundancy has an extraordinary list of partisans.
Let's get right to it. First, at the Supreme Court.
GRAPH 1
"Pellucidly Clear" by the Supremes
(click to enlarge)
"Pellucidly clear" appears in 16 cases in Supreme Court history. Its vintage at the Court is quite recent. It was first used in the 1980 decision in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co. Writing the Court's opinion, Justice Stevens said of the issue to be resolved: "The answer to this question is pellucidly clear."And thus began the Supreme Court's --actually Stevens'--veritable love affair with the phrase. It was Stevens, the leader of the Court's liberal wing, who used it in every one of the 16 cases.
Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court's most outspoken conservative, did use the phrase in one of those cases. He did so in his 2007 dissent in Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Dept. of Educ. But he was only mimicking Stevens who had used the phrase in the majority opinion. So it's clear that Stevens' use was serious, while Scalia's was pellucidly sarcastic.
What about the state supreme courts? Well take a look.
GRAPH 2
"Pellucidly Clear" in the State Supremes
(click to enlarge)
"Pellucidly clear" has been used in 14 decisions by state supreme courts. It's a pretty strong collection of courts. Certainly, the New York Court of Appeals and the California Supreme Court have historically been among the most influential judicial tribunals in the country.Indeed, there is no little unspoken competition between those 2 as to which has had a greater impact on torts, contracts, criminal investigation and adjudication, and other areas of the law. And in the last several decades, which court has been more a leader in taking an independent course from the rightward direction of the U.S. Supreme Court in constitutional rights and liberties.
In "pellucidly clear"cases, however, New York is the unquestionable leader among state high courts. Its 6 cases are double the number of California's.
On the other hand, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, with just 1 "pellucidly clear" case to its name, is the first state high court to use the phrase. In the 1971 decision in State v. I, A Woman, Justice (later Chief Justice) Nathan Heffernan put one of the issues in the case to rest as follows: "it [is] ‘pellucidly clear’--to quote a favorite phrase of the appellant district attorney--that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." It's also pellucidly clear that the phrase was not one of Heffernan's favorite but, like Scalia years later in Zuni, he was using it for chiding effect.
And who were the other users on the state supreme courts?
GRAPH 3
"Pellucidly Clear" by State Supremes
(click to enlarge)
Again--as with the state courts themselves--this is a pretty strong collection. New York's Judge Meyer, who was mentioned earlier, is the champ here.He was a brilliant Judge, both on the trial bench and on the Court of Appeals, where he acknowledged himself an avowed activist in trying to do justice. (Unfortunately, his tenure on the high tribunal was cut to a short 7 years by the state's moronic law mandating retirement from the court at age 70. But that's a whole 'nother matter.)
In 2d place is California's Stanley Mosk. One of the nation's most venerable and beloved judges of the past century, his 37 year tenure is the longest in the state Supreme Court's history. Mosk's opinions influenced the development of virtually every area of the law dealt with in America's state courts. He was also an early and persistent influence on the state courts and their justices nationwide in developing state constitutional jurisprudence independent of U.S. Supreme Court case law.
In 3d place on the "pellucidly clear" list is New York's Judith Kaye. In addition to serving as the state's Chief Judge for more than a quarter century--the longest in New York history--Kaye earned a reputation as a scholar, an administrative reformer, one of the nation's leading advocates for independent state constitutional decision-making, and--oh, almost forgot to mention--she was the first woman to sit on the New York Court of Appeals and the first woman Chief Judge. Not surprisingly, Kaye (who was a victim of that moronic state retirement law last year) was one of the nation's most prominent and admired judicial figures in the United States.
Not too shabby for "pellucidly clear" so far, huh?
Now let's check out the U.S. Courts of Appeals--the circuit courts. First, look at the total number of cases in which our fast-becoming favorite phrase was used in those courts.
GRAPH 4
"Pellucidly Clear" in the U.S. Circuit Courts
(click to enlarge)
"Pellucidly clear" has been used by the federal appeals courts in 103 cases. But in no less than 40 of those, the use was actually a direct quote or a reference to Justice Stevens' use of the phrase in Gall v. U.S. (He wrote the majority opinion in that 2007 case dealing with the proper consideration of federal sentencing guidelines--a matter frequently reviewed by the circuit courts.).That leaves 63 "pellucidly clear" cases not merely parroting Stevens. So how do the individual circuits stack up on these?
Take a look.
GRAPH 5
"Pellucidly Clear" by Circuit Court
(click to enlarge)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit, sitting in Boston, leads the pack. The 4th Circuit in Richmond, Virginia, and the 2d Circuit in New York City complete the top "pellucidly clear" trio.But the 9th Circuit, sitting in San Francisco, has the distinction of using the phrase first. It also has the distinction of having an extraordinarily distinguished judge use it that time. The case was Johnson v. Gardner, a 1950 bankruptcy appeal. The judge, Paul McCormick, was actually a trial judge in federal district court in southern California. Later in his career, however, he would be asked to sit by designation on the circuit court.
His use of the phrase--that first use in circuit courts--was unexceptional. ("It is pellucidly clear... that the action in the District Court was entirely and essentially one of equit[y]") But he was anything but that. Among this Calvin Coolidge appointee's legacies is his decision in Mendez v. Westminster Sch. Dist. In that 1946 case--a trial over which McCormick presided--he ruled that California's "separate but equal" schools for Mexicans violated constitutional equal protection.
The 9th Circuit affirmed his decision and Governor Earl Warren then signed legislation repealing the state's system of segregated schools. Of course, 8 years after McCormick's ruling in Mendez, the same Earl Warren was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and he wrote the decision in Brown v. Bd. of Ed. ending "separate but equal" for the entire country.
McCormick used "pellucidly clear" only once as a federal appeals judge. So who were the all-time leaders.
GRAPH 6
"Pellucidly Clear" by Federal Appeals Judges
(click to enlarge)
Justice Stevens beats all the circuit judges. But Bruce Selya of the 1st Circuit used "pellucidly clear" in only 1 fewer case. No one else is close.Having served 20 years on the 1st Circuit, Judge Selya is currently on senior (semi-retired) status. At the same time, however, he is the presiding judge of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review. Considered one of the American judiciary's most erudite writers, he is among a handful of the most cited federal judges.
After Selya comes Per Curiam opinions out of the 5th Circuit, which sits in New Orleans. Most of these 5 unsigned opinions are summary rulings insisting that the court is bound to follow Supreme Court precedent, even if it is "pellucidly clear" that the Supreme Court itself would no longer follow it. (Hardly one of the highlights of the "pellucidly clear" catalogue.)
Then comes Judge Thomas Ellis who used "pellucidly clear" in 4 cases. Like Judge McCormick, Ellis is actually a federal trial judge who is sometimes asked to sit on an appellate court. He has sat on both the 3d Circuit in Philadelphia and on the 4th in Richmond. This trial judge from the the eastern district of Virginia is a former Naval aviator, and in recent years he has presided over some espionage, terrorist, and national security cases that were in national headlines.
Then there's Francis Murnaghan of the 4th Circuit. Prior to his death a few years ago, he was a forceful and widely-admired liberal voice on a court that had become one of the nation's most conservative benches. A prolific writer of dissenting and concurring opinions, he authored hundreds of such separate opinions taking issue with his colleagues.
The remaining 2 judges depicted in the graph--the remaining federal appeals judges who have used "pellucidly clear" more than once, and not just quoting someone else--are widely recognized as 2 of the federal bench's brightest stars. Judge Robert Katzmann of the 2d Circuit is a political scientist (PhD, Harvard) and lawyer (JD, Yale). Prior to his appointment to the 2d Circuit, he was a fellow at the Brookings Institution and a professor of government, law and public policy at Georgetown.
Judge Diane Wood of the 7th Circuit, which sits in Chicago, seems to be on everyone's short-list for the Supreme Court. Her career in academia and government has included a clerkship with Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun, a position as an assistant attorney general in the justice department, professorships at both Georgetown and Chicago (where she was associate dean and still teaches), as well as the authorship of an extensive body of legal scholarship. As a judge on the 7th Circuit, she is viewed as a brilliant liberal counterweight to conservative judicial giants Richard Posner and Frank Estabrook.
Finally, mention must be made of Henry Friendly. Following Judge McCormick's use of the phrase in 1950 [see above], Friendly was next in the 1973 2d Circuit case of Blanton v. S.U.N.Y.
He did use "pellucidly clear" in only one case. But he was the second federal appeals judge to do so, and he was Henry Friendly.
One of the most revered judges to sit on the federal bench, his name was repeated frequently as Chief Justice John Roberts's mentor--the latter having clerked for Friendly. The transparent--better yet, pellucid--purpose being to suggest a favorable comparison.
As one commentator recently wrote in addressing that attempt: "Comparing any judge to Henry Friendly is like comparing any basketball player to Michael Jordan." (Robert Gordon, Slate Magazine.) Or as Justice Felix Frakfurter put it while Friendly was still on the bench: he's "the best judge now writing opinions on the American scene." (Of course, the anything-but-humble Frankfurter had already retired from the Supreme Court, so he was certainly not placing himself below Friendly.)
Following Friendly's death in 1986, Chief Justice Warren Burger said, "I have never known a judge more qualified to sit on the Supreme Court." [Of course, like most of the best, he never made it.] And the esteemed Judge Jon Newman, of Friendly's own 2d Circuit, called him "quite simply the pre-eminent appellate judge of his era."
Yep, that was Henry Friendly. And he used "pellucidly clear." Add to him the other judicial luminaries discussed in this post and you have a veritable pantheon. An extraordinary list of judges who have smiled favorably upon that appealing redundancy.
Stevens, Meyer, Mosk, Kaye, McCormick, Selya, Ellis, Murnaghan, Katzmann, Wood, and Friendly!!
That is some impressive judicial pedigree. And that's good enough reason to go ahead, use "pellucidly clear," and be proud!
Saturday, December 5, 2009
NY Court of Appeals: Granting Criminal Appeals--Up, Down, Now Up Again? (Part 7: Pataki's Attack and The Court's Retreat)
The drastic drop in granting criminal appeals came immediately after 1995. That fact emerged from the data reported in the last 2 posts on New York Court Watcher. Indeed, it became pellucidly clear [Don't you just love the tempo of that redundancy?] when the curious 1997 blip was investigated and adjusted.
(See the discussion in the last post on New York Court Watcher about the 54 separate CLA grants in 1997 that arose out of a single appeal in a lower court and were treated as a single appeal at the Court of Appeals: NY Court of Appeals: Granting Criminal Appeals--Up, Down, Now Up Again? (Part 6: The 1997 "Blip" & What it Says About the Drop), Dec. 2, 2009.)
As was shown in the last blog, with the 1997 blip adjusted, here's how the annual CLA grants by the Court of Appeals' Judges look, from 1988 through 2008.
GRAPH 1
Total CLA's Granted by COA Judges
Annual Number, 1988 to 2008
(Adjusted 1997)
(click to enlarge)
Yep, pellucidly clear.
(Actually, I don't normally use that phrase. But there was a Judge at the Court when I was clerking who liked to use it. And I recently noticed it used in a Supreme Court opinion. [Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Baze v. Rees (1988).] So I'm apparently not alone in finding some mellifluous appeal in that redundancy.)
Immediately following 1995, the floor fell from under CLA grants at the Court of Appeals. As the graph shows, this was no accident or fluke. The sharply reduced rate of CLA grants continued year after year, right to the end of Chief Judge Kaye's tenure--i.e., through 2008, the last full calendar year. Some decision must have been made. Some change in policy. And right after 1995.
So what's with 1995? Anything happening?
Well, for one thing, let's recall a graph from an earlier post in this series. It depicts the patterns in the Court's decisions and voting in criminal appeals before and after 1995. Actually, it reflects the findings from past studies of mine on the Court's decisions and voting, beginning with the 2-year period, 1994 and 1995, and several 2- year periods thereafter.
Let's look.
GRAPH 2
Pro-Accused Decision & Voting Records
Divided Criminal Cases
1994+95 - 2001+01
(click to enlarge)
If we focus on the Court itself, it's hard to miss. The Court's decisional record turned increasingly conservative over the periods covered--i.e., less pro-defendant, more pro-prosecution. Siding with the accused less frequently, approving convictions more frequently. And that happened immediately after 1995.
If that's not sufficiently clear, let's zero in on the voting of a couple of the individual Judges.
Now-retired Chief Judge Judith Kaye and still-active Judge Carmen Ciparick could fairly be labeled liberal. At least as that term is used in common parlance. In criminal cases that would mean more sympathetic to the claims of defendants, more rigorous in the enforcement of the rights of the accused, less willing to overlook misconduct by the police or prosecutors, less tolerant of constitutional violations in investigation, interrogation, and the conduct of trials.
In that sense, Kaye's and Ciparick's voting over the years placed them on the more liberal, or less conservative, side of the Court's ideological spectrum. But let's look at their voting post-1995.
GRAPH 3
Chief Judge Kaye's Voting Record
Divided Criminal Cases
(click to enlarge)
Kaye's voting reflects the Court's decisional record. It became more conservative. This graph--another I did earlier that incorporates past studies of mine--divides the then most recent 15 years of Kaye's career on the Court into 5-year periods. The last such period, all of which is post-1995, shows an unmistakable decline in her liberal voting.
Focusing on criminal cases, her voting--like the Court's decisions--became less pro-defendant. More conservative.
Let's now look at Ciparick's record around the same time.
GRAPH 4
Judge Ciparick's Voting Record
Divided Criminal Cases
(click to enlarge)
Like Kaye's record, Ciparick's reflects the Court's conservative swing at the time. This graph looks at the entire 8 years that Ciparick had been on the Court at the time. It splits those years in half. For the period that's entirely post-1995, Ciparick's voting was unmistakeably less liberal.
In criminal cases, her voting was significantly less pro-defendant. Like Kaye's record, and like that of the Court as a whole.
Let's look again at the Court's record. This time let's isolate it from the individual Judges' voting, and let's look at it over a more extended period of time.
GRAPH 5
Pro-Accused Decisional Record
Divided Criminal Cases
Early Kaye Court - 2004-06
(click to enlarge)
Again, pellucidly clear. The Court's record in criminal cases became decidedly more conservative after 1995. Less pro-accused, more pro-prosecution. And that conservative turn persisted for many years thereafter. A series of 4 consecutive 2-year studies shows that.
The Court's decisional record didn't return to it's previous form--or fairly near to that--at least until 2003.
So what was this all about. Well, it just so happens that the pro-prosecution turn in the Court's decisional record--as reflected also in the voting of Kaye and Ciparick--immediately followed a harsh campaign of public attacks upon the Court. You guessed: for being too liberal. You know: for "coddling criminals."
The newly-elected Republican Governor George Pataki began it all with a press conference in November 1995. He was unrelenting for the next year. As a prelude to introducing tough-on-crime legislation, Pataki blasted the Court for creating "irrational, mindless procedural safeguards," for favoring "criminal rights" over the "rights of the people," for being "very different from the rest of the country" that "have a common-sense system of justice," and for lots of the same.
Pataki's Attorney General echoed the charges. He accused the Court of being "intent on coddling dangerous criminals" with its "arcane technicalities and liberal legal interpretations."New York City's police commissioner joined in, referring to the "screwball Court of Appeals" that's "living off in Disneyland somewhere."
The tabloids, not surprisingly, couldn't resist. The Daily News castigated the "Friend to the Felon"on page 1, and ridiculed the Court as "that ideological dog and pony show" in its editorial. The Post declared on its front page that the "State's Top Court Sides with Crooks," and it denounced the Court for "Rulings Wacky Enough to Make Your Head Spin."
So went the barrage against the Court from Pataki's 1995 press conference to well into 1996.
(The merits of these attacks on the Court are beyond the focus of this post. For an examination of the criticisms, their merits, and how they affected the Court, see e.g. my
(See the discussion in the last post on New York Court Watcher about the 54 separate CLA grants in 1997 that arose out of a single appeal in a lower court and were treated as a single appeal at the Court of Appeals: NY Court of Appeals: Granting Criminal Appeals--Up, Down, Now Up Again? (Part 6: The 1997 "Blip" & What it Says About the Drop), Dec. 2, 2009.)
As was shown in the last blog, with the 1997 blip adjusted, here's how the annual CLA grants by the Court of Appeals' Judges look, from 1988 through 2008.
GRAPH 1
Total CLA's Granted by COA Judges
Annual Number, 1988 to 2008
(Adjusted 1997)
(click to enlarge)
Yep, pellucidly clear.
(Actually, I don't normally use that phrase. But there was a Judge at the Court when I was clerking who liked to use it. And I recently noticed it used in a Supreme Court opinion. [Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Baze v. Rees (1988).] So I'm apparently not alone in finding some mellifluous appeal in that redundancy.)
Immediately following 1995, the floor fell from under CLA grants at the Court of Appeals. As the graph shows, this was no accident or fluke. The sharply reduced rate of CLA grants continued year after year, right to the end of Chief Judge Kaye's tenure--i.e., through 2008, the last full calendar year. Some decision must have been made. Some change in policy. And right after 1995.
So what's with 1995? Anything happening?
Well, for one thing, let's recall a graph from an earlier post in this series. It depicts the patterns in the Court's decisions and voting in criminal appeals before and after 1995. Actually, it reflects the findings from past studies of mine on the Court's decisions and voting, beginning with the 2-year period, 1994 and 1995, and several 2- year periods thereafter.
Let's look.
GRAPH 2
Pro-Accused Decision & Voting Records
Divided Criminal Cases
1994+95 - 2001+01
(click to enlarge)
If we focus on the Court itself, it's hard to miss. The Court's decisional record turned increasingly conservative over the periods covered--i.e., less pro-defendant, more pro-prosecution. Siding with the accused less frequently, approving convictions more frequently. And that happened immediately after 1995.
If that's not sufficiently clear, let's zero in on the voting of a couple of the individual Judges.
Now-retired Chief Judge Judith Kaye and still-active Judge Carmen Ciparick could fairly be labeled liberal. At least as that term is used in common parlance. In criminal cases that would mean more sympathetic to the claims of defendants, more rigorous in the enforcement of the rights of the accused, less willing to overlook misconduct by the police or prosecutors, less tolerant of constitutional violations in investigation, interrogation, and the conduct of trials.
In that sense, Kaye's and Ciparick's voting over the years placed them on the more liberal, or less conservative, side of the Court's ideological spectrum. But let's look at their voting post-1995.
GRAPH 3
Chief Judge Kaye's Voting Record
Divided Criminal Cases
(click to enlarge)
Kaye's voting reflects the Court's decisional record. It became more conservative. This graph--another I did earlier that incorporates past studies of mine--divides the then most recent 15 years of Kaye's career on the Court into 5-year periods. The last such period, all of which is post-1995, shows an unmistakable decline in her liberal voting.
Focusing on criminal cases, her voting--like the Court's decisions--became less pro-defendant. More conservative.
Let's now look at Ciparick's record around the same time.
GRAPH 4
Judge Ciparick's Voting Record
Divided Criminal Cases
(click to enlarge)
Like Kaye's record, Ciparick's reflects the Court's conservative swing at the time. This graph looks at the entire 8 years that Ciparick had been on the Court at the time. It splits those years in half. For the period that's entirely post-1995, Ciparick's voting was unmistakeably less liberal.
In criminal cases, her voting was significantly less pro-defendant. Like Kaye's record, and like that of the Court as a whole.
Let's look again at the Court's record. This time let's isolate it from the individual Judges' voting, and let's look at it over a more extended period of time.
GRAPH 5
Pro-Accused Decisional Record
Divided Criminal Cases
Early Kaye Court - 2004-06
(click to enlarge)
Again, pellucidly clear. The Court's record in criminal cases became decidedly more conservative after 1995. Less pro-accused, more pro-prosecution. And that conservative turn persisted for many years thereafter. A series of 4 consecutive 2-year studies shows that.
The Court's decisional record didn't return to it's previous form--or fairly near to that--at least until 2003.
So what was this all about. Well, it just so happens that the pro-prosecution turn in the Court's decisional record--as reflected also in the voting of Kaye and Ciparick--immediately followed a harsh campaign of public attacks upon the Court. You guessed: for being too liberal. You know: for "coddling criminals."
The newly-elected Republican Governor George Pataki began it all with a press conference in November 1995. He was unrelenting for the next year. As a prelude to introducing tough-on-crime legislation, Pataki blasted the Court for creating "irrational, mindless procedural safeguards," for favoring "criminal rights" over the "rights of the people," for being "very different from the rest of the country" that "have a common-sense system of justice," and for lots of the same.
Pataki's Attorney General echoed the charges. He accused the Court of being "intent on coddling dangerous criminals" with its "arcane technicalities and liberal legal interpretations."New York City's police commissioner joined in, referring to the "screwball Court of Appeals" that's "living off in Disneyland somewhere."
The tabloids, not surprisingly, couldn't resist. The Daily News castigated the "Friend to the Felon"on page 1, and ridiculed the Court as "that ideological dog and pony show" in its editorial. The Post declared on its front page that the "State's Top Court Sides with Crooks," and it denounced the Court for "Rulings Wacky Enough to Make Your Head Spin."
So went the barrage against the Court from Pataki's 1995 press conference to well into 1996.
(The merits of these attacks on the Court are beyond the focus of this post. For an examination of the criticisms, their merits, and how they affected the Court, see e.g. my
"Court Bashing and Reality: A Comparative Examination of Criminal Dispositions at the New York Court of Appeals and Neighboring High Courts," [w/ Judi A. DeMarco] Judges' Journal, Vol. 36, No. 1, Winter 1997 [also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1155547]; STREAMS OF TENDENCY ON THE NEW YORK COURT, ch. 3 [Hein 2003].)
AND, the time of that assault upon the Court--from Pataki, his partisans, and the media--is the time that things changed at the Court. The Court's decisional record became significantly more pro-prosecution. The voting records of Kaye and Ciparick showed the very same. And the Court began to grant appeals in criminal cases at a much lower rate.
Yes, that's when CLA grants were cut sharply. Was the Court avoiding the kinds of cases that brought it such condemnation? Deciding those cases more conservatively and reducing their number. To avoid any more trouble with the politicians, the press, and the public?
Who can say why? At least with certainty? The numbers, the decisions, the votes, the grants can't tell us that. At least not for sure. But they can--and they do--tell us that the Court DID change its treatment of criminal cases immediately following the criticisms heaped upon it in 1995 and 1996. Decisions became more conservative. So did voting patterns. And CLA grants dropped precipitously.
In the next post in this series, we'll take a closer look at the most recent change upwards in those CLA grants at the Court.
AND, the time of that assault upon the Court--from Pataki, his partisans, and the media--is the time that things changed at the Court. The Court's decisional record became significantly more pro-prosecution. The voting records of Kaye and Ciparick showed the very same. And the Court began to grant appeals in criminal cases at a much lower rate.
Yes, that's when CLA grants were cut sharply. Was the Court avoiding the kinds of cases that brought it such condemnation? Deciding those cases more conservatively and reducing their number. To avoid any more trouble with the politicians, the press, and the public?
Who can say why? At least with certainty? The numbers, the decisions, the votes, the grants can't tell us that. At least not for sure. But they can--and they do--tell us that the Court DID change its treatment of criminal cases immediately following the criticisms heaped upon it in 1995 and 1996. Decisions became more conservative. So did voting patterns. And CLA grants dropped precipitously.
In the next post in this series, we'll take a closer look at the most recent change upwards in those CLA grants at the Court.
Wednesday, December 2, 2009
NY Court of Appeals: Granting Criminal Appeals--Up, Down, Now Up Again? (Part 6: The 1997 "Blip" & What it Says About the Drop)
In the last post, we saw a significant blip in CLA grants for 1997. This occured even as the rate of CLA grants had taken a dive in the preceding year and then proceeded at the sharply reduced rate after 1997. The data showed that, between 1995 and 1998, the Court of Appeals cut the rate at which it would henceforth be granting CLA's. The number of CLA grants by Court of Appeals Judges dropped immediately after 1995, and the sharply reduced rate seemed clearly settled by 1999--but only after an erratic and substantial uptick in 1997.
Here's how the data looked in a graph.
GRAPH 1
Total CLA's Granted by COA Judges
Annual Number, 1988 to 2008
(Unadjusted 1997)
(click to enlarge)
1997 simply did not fit within the obvious pattern. CLA grants were higher for 1995 and previous years; much lower for 1996 and future years. Except for 1997.
If something changed in 1996--and, as depicted in Graph 1, the data certainly shows it did--then something out of the ordinary happened in 1997. Why the sudden, single-year, dramatic rise in CLA grants?
Well, seek and you shall find! Not only will you find, but it will make even clearer and more evident what seemed pretty clear and evident to begin with.
What did happen in 1997? Fast forward to the Court's decision the following year in People v. Allen (92 NY2d 378 [1998]). As the Court stated early in its unanimous opinion: "In these 54 criminal cases, combined for the purposes of this appeal," the defendants were all arrested in "a series of 'reverse sting' operations conducted by the Rochester City Police Department during April 1995." Hmmm, 54 cases, all involving the same kind of undercover operation, by the same police force, and all in the same month in 1995. [For anyone ineterested in the facts of the case: each defendant had been sold oregano, thinking it was marihuana. They were each arrested and charged with criminal solicitation. The Court of Appeals dismissed the charges against all 54 defendants.)
The Court of Appeals decided the case--well, the 54 cases combined into 1--in 1998. That means that somehow, at some time, 54 defendants were granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. It was really 1 appeal, involving the same facts and same issue--54 times in 1 consolidated appeal under the title People v. Allen.
And sure enough, in 1997, the year before the decision in Allen, the 54 defendants applied to the Court of Appeals and each of their CLA's were granted for the 1 consolidated appeal. 54 CLA's granted to resolve the same issue in 1 appeal and, thus, deciding all 54 cases at once.
In fact, in the Court of Appeals 1998 Annual Report (the earliest one available on its website), a special explanation is added for the CLA's granted in 1997. An asterisk footnote states that the tabulation of CLA's for 1997 "[i]ncludes grants of 54 separate applications handled as a single appeal below and handled as a single appeal in this Court."
A more accurate number for CLA's granted in 1997 would, then, count those 54 grants as 1. In short, for the purpose of examining, counting, and comparing the number of criminal cases the Court agreed to decide on appeal each year, counting the 54 CLA's as 54 separate cases--even when the Court treats them as a single appeal-- distorts what the figures represent.
So, if the 54 cases consolidated into 1 appeal by the Court of Appeals are treated as the single appeal that they really are, then the CLA figure for 1997 should be adjusted to reflect that.
(Treating the 54 CLA grants as a single appeal--as the Court itself did--reduces the 1997 grant figure by 53. For those arithmatically challenged, that's subtracting the 54 cases initially counted, and then adding 1 for which they more accurately count. The inital total from my research was 112. The adjusted total is 59.)
Now let's see how the data looks with the 1997 figure adjusted.
GRAPH 2
Total CLA's Granted by COA Judges
Annual Number, 1988 to 2008
(Adjusted 1997)
(click to enlarge)
In Graph 2, the initial figure for 1997 has been replaced with the adjusted figure. Again, it reflects the Court's treatment of the 54 cases in People v. Allen as a single appeal. With the number of CLA grants for 1997 thus adjusted, the pattern is even clearer, and the time when the change occured is even more certain.
1995 was the last year the Court's Judges granted CLA's at a higher rate. In 1996, the Judges cut the number of grants sharply, and that sharply reduced rate persisted through last year.
So now that the little 1997 mystery has been solved, we'll return to our examination of the Court's drastic cut in CLA grants. It's now even more evident that the reduction occurred immediately after 1995. In the last post, we concluded with a brief look at the Court's decisional record in criminal cases--it become noticeably more pro-prosecution just about the same time that the rate of CLA grants was being cut. Right after 1995.
We'll take a closer look at 1995, what was happening, and the aftermath, in the next post.
Here's how the data looked in a graph.
GRAPH 1
Total CLA's Granted by COA Judges
Annual Number, 1988 to 2008
(Unadjusted 1997)
(click to enlarge)
1997 simply did not fit within the obvious pattern. CLA grants were higher for 1995 and previous years; much lower for 1996 and future years. Except for 1997.
If something changed in 1996--and, as depicted in Graph 1, the data certainly shows it did--then something out of the ordinary happened in 1997. Why the sudden, single-year, dramatic rise in CLA grants?
Well, seek and you shall find! Not only will you find, but it will make even clearer and more evident what seemed pretty clear and evident to begin with.
What did happen in 1997? Fast forward to the Court's decision the following year in People v. Allen (92 NY2d 378 [1998]). As the Court stated early in its unanimous opinion: "In these 54 criminal cases, combined for the purposes of this appeal," the defendants were all arrested in "a series of 'reverse sting' operations conducted by the Rochester City Police Department during April 1995." Hmmm, 54 cases, all involving the same kind of undercover operation, by the same police force, and all in the same month in 1995. [For anyone ineterested in the facts of the case: each defendant had been sold oregano, thinking it was marihuana. They were each arrested and charged with criminal solicitation. The Court of Appeals dismissed the charges against all 54 defendants.)
The Court of Appeals decided the case--well, the 54 cases combined into 1--in 1998. That means that somehow, at some time, 54 defendants were granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. It was really 1 appeal, involving the same facts and same issue--54 times in 1 consolidated appeal under the title People v. Allen.
And sure enough, in 1997, the year before the decision in Allen, the 54 defendants applied to the Court of Appeals and each of their CLA's were granted for the 1 consolidated appeal. 54 CLA's granted to resolve the same issue in 1 appeal and, thus, deciding all 54 cases at once.
In fact, in the Court of Appeals 1998 Annual Report (the earliest one available on its website), a special explanation is added for the CLA's granted in 1997. An asterisk footnote states that the tabulation of CLA's for 1997 "[i]ncludes grants of 54 separate applications handled as a single appeal below and handled as a single appeal in this Court."
A more accurate number for CLA's granted in 1997 would, then, count those 54 grants as 1. In short, for the purpose of examining, counting, and comparing the number of criminal cases the Court agreed to decide on appeal each year, counting the 54 CLA's as 54 separate cases--even when the Court treats them as a single appeal-- distorts what the figures represent.
So, if the 54 cases consolidated into 1 appeal by the Court of Appeals are treated as the single appeal that they really are, then the CLA figure for 1997 should be adjusted to reflect that.
(Treating the 54 CLA grants as a single appeal--as the Court itself did--reduces the 1997 grant figure by 53. For those arithmatically challenged, that's subtracting the 54 cases initially counted, and then adding 1 for which they more accurately count. The inital total from my research was 112. The adjusted total is 59.)
Now let's see how the data looks with the 1997 figure adjusted.
GRAPH 2
Total CLA's Granted by COA Judges
Annual Number, 1988 to 2008
(Adjusted 1997)
(click to enlarge)
In Graph 2, the initial figure for 1997 has been replaced with the adjusted figure. Again, it reflects the Court's treatment of the 54 cases in People v. Allen as a single appeal. With the number of CLA grants for 1997 thus adjusted, the pattern is even clearer, and the time when the change occured is even more certain.
1995 was the last year the Court's Judges granted CLA's at a higher rate. In 1996, the Judges cut the number of grants sharply, and that sharply reduced rate persisted through last year.
So now that the little 1997 mystery has been solved, we'll return to our examination of the Court's drastic cut in CLA grants. It's now even more evident that the reduction occurred immediately after 1995. In the last post, we concluded with a brief look at the Court's decisional record in criminal cases--it become noticeably more pro-prosecution just about the same time that the rate of CLA grants was being cut. Right after 1995.
We'll take a closer look at 1995, what was happening, and the aftermath, in the next post.
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