Supreme Court, 2013-14 Term: Quick Recap (Part 3: a few more cases)

To conclude this series, here are 3 additional significant decisions--one that I should have included in part 1, and two others that don't fit very well in either part 1 or 2.

Supreme Court, 2013-14 Term: Quick Recap (Part 2: criminal cases)

Let's now move to the Court's decisions in criminal cases. As we did with civil rights and liberties decisions in the previous post, we'll take a quick, bare-bones look at some of the most significant cases.

Supreme Court, 2013-14 Term: Quick Recap (Part 1: civil rights and liberties)

The Court finished its term Monday. The decisions announced that morning, in the cases dealing with the contraceptive mandate and union dues, were the final two in a veritable whirlwind the past few weeks.

Out of the 70 or so decisions rendered this term, let's take a quick look at some of the most significant. "Quick" as in a very brief bare-bone recap of each. And "significant" as in cases involving issues of liberty and order, rights and responsibilities, equality and justice that are basic to a free society--the ones most of us are interested in, not just lawyers and businesses.

We'll do this quick recap in 2 parts, civil and criminal. Later, we'll look at these cases more closely. I.e., votes, meaning, impact, precedential ramifications, etc.
(We'll also be reviewing some of the significant decisions rendered by the New York Court of Appeals this year .)

(Part 2) Supreme Court's New Term: Headliners & Possible Blockbusters

Let's now turn our attention to 3 other important appeals already on the Court's docket this new term.

We previously looked at 3 cases dealing with campaign finance, abortion clinics, and town prayer in the last post. That first set of cases all involved First Amendment issues. This next group raise diverse constitutional claims: equal protection, search & seizure, and presidential power.

Affirmative Action (Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action)
This case involves a state law that forbids racial preferences--but forbids no others--in college admissions.

Ever since its split decision in the 1978 Bakke case, the Court has struggled with racial preferences in higher education, as well as in other contexts. Justice Lewis Powell cast the swing vote in that case. Race was permissible as one plus factor, among others, in evaluating an application for college admissions.

Then, in its 2003 Grutter decision, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor--who had replaced Powell as the Court's swing vote--similarly cast the deciding vote. Racial preferences were acceptable to promote the "compelling" educational interest in diversity.

This past June, the Court issued its latest decision about affirmative action in higher education admissions. The vote in the Fisher case was 7-1. (Only 8 votes because Justice Kagan did not participate.) But that numerical division fails to reflect the deep differences among the Justices. It only represents near unanimity on a single point: any use of race in making decisions must first be justified by some compelling purpose that could not otherwise be achieved.

So, would racial preferences actually be permitted under those circumstances? If yes, would permissibility be based on the Justices' own view of compelling educational needs? Or those of the educational institution or of education experts? In this regard, it is notable that Justice Samuel Alito has replaced O'Connor, and he seems much less sympathetic to a need for affirmative action.

With that in mind, consider that the Court has chosen to review yet another affirmative action case this term. And it's a case in which supporters of affirmative action won in the federal appeals court below.

The Schuette case involves a Michigan provision--adopted directly by the voters--that bans any consideration of race in college admissions. The provision was adopted following the previously mentioned Grutter decision which had upheld the University of Michigan's race conscious program.

Preferences of all sorts in college admissions were left untouched by the provision. Legacies, athletics, geography, birthplace, family gifts, etc., etc., etc. They may still be used. Only race (and gender)--even if necessary to achieve a purpose deemed compelling--is forbidden.

May the voters of a state remove racial preferences as a factor in decision-making on college admissions? Even if those preferences are singled out (with gender only) for elimination?
[This discussion was edited for correction subsequent to the date of posting in order to note that gender preferences were outlawed as well those for race.]

Supreme Court's New Term: Headliners & Possible Blockbusters (Part 1)

The Court's new term has begun in full swing. Since the first Monday in October--the Court's traditional opening session of arguments--the Justices have been confronting headline issues that could generate blockbuster decisions.

Campaign finance. Abortion clinics. Town prayers. Affirmative action. Warrantless home searches. Presidential recess appointments. Those are among the controversial matters already on the Court's docket.

Let's take a quick look at those cases. We'll start with a few that pose questions under the First Amendment.

[I've been talking a lot about these cases. So, for those who'd prefer--or would like to supplement this post--I've placed links to a couple of radio and TV interviews at the end.]

Campaign Finance (McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission)
In the 2010 Citizens United decision, the Court upheld a First Amendment right to spend money to finance political communications--in that case, a documentary critical of Hillary Clinton. By a bare majority, the Justices ruled that the restrictions on such expenditures, imposed by the McCain Feingold Law, violated free speech.

The McCutcheon case this term deals, not with expenditures per se, but with contributions to political parties or candidates. The McCain Feingold Law imposes various limits on the amount of such contributions allowable.

Are the restrictions on contributions also invalid? Do they violate free speech just as the restrictions on expenditures were held to do in Citizens United?

The decision may well rest on whether any of the conservative Justices believe that unlimited contributions made directly to political parties or candidates create a much greater risk of corruption than do expenditures made for independent communications.