One More Time: The Supreme Court Again Says Reconsider NY's Abortion Mandate!

Yes, once again, the New York courts suffered an embarrassing unanimous, summary overruling of their decisions which persistently upheld the imposition of the state's abortion coverage mandate upon religious objecting organizations, such as a Roman Catholic Diocese.

For years now, I've been discussing New York's mandate that employers include abortion coverage in their employee health insurance. I have not disguised my strong objections to the state government imposing this mandate upon religiously objecting institutions, nor my utter contempt for those rulings of the New York courts that have shown no regard for trampling on free exercise of religion. (It's only the First Amendment!)

For example, consider the first round of litigation, brought by the Albany Catholic Diocese, claiming that it was entitled to a religious exemption from the abortion mandate. The Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, summarily --i.e., without the full appellate process--dismissed the case. Here's the--hard to believe--ruling:

On the Court's own motion, appeal dismissed, 

without costs, upon the ground that no substantial

constitutional question is directly involved. [My emphasis.]

(Nov. 24, 2020.)

No substantial constitutional question?

But then, the Supreme Court, in its own summary, unanimous order--yes, all the conservative and liberals Justices--told the New York courts to try again. Here are the Justices' own words:

CERTIORARI -- SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS

20-1501 ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE, ET AL. V. EMAMI, SHIRIN, ET AL.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The

judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded. [My emphasis.]

(Nov. 1, 2021.)

(For a more complete discussion and reference to previous related posts on New York Court Watcher, see, REPRISE: Religious Institutions Must Pay Abortion Coverage in NY, Nov. 1, 2021.)

In the second round of litigation on the very same matter, the New York courts again upheld the imposition of the abortion mandate upon religiously objecting institutions--i.e., holding that the religious institutions, such as a Catholic Diocese, were not entitled to the mandate's very narrow religious exemption. (New York only allows exemptions for churches and other analogous institutions, but not for faith-based organizations such as Catholic Charities.)

On this go round, the Court of Appeals at least did not say that there was no constitutional question worth its time. But the Court did, nevertheless, uphold the mandate as imposed on religiously objecting institutions. (See Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany v. Vullo, May 21, 2024.)  

Yesterday, the Supreme Court once again summarily and unanimously--yes, again, all the conservative and liberal Justices--granted the Albany Diocese's appeal (i.e., the writ for certiorari) and overruled the New York courts' insistence on upholding the abortion mandate against religious objectors and refusing to grant them an exemption.. Here it is:

ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE, ET AL. V. HARRIS, ADRIENNE A., ET AL.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The

judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals [My emphasis.]

June 16, 2025.) 

The Supreme Court ordered the Court of Appeals to reconsider the case, specifically in light of the Justices' decision earlier this month in Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Comm'n. (June 4, 2025.) In that decision, the Supreme Court unanimously--yes, all the conservatives and all the liberals--overruled Wisconsin's refusal to grant a religious exemption to Catholic Charities. The state had a narrow exemption in its tax law for churches and analogous institutions whose purpose is religious practice. But the mission of Catholic Charities and similar faith-based organizations is to provide social services and perform other charitable works. It is not simply to engage in religious practices such as baptism, prayer, and proselytizing. So they were not entitled to religious exemptions. It made no difference that Catholic Charities and similar organizations are founded on religious convictions to help those in need.

The Supreme Court, in its unanimous reversal of the Wisconsin court, stressed the unremarkable constitutional principle that a state cannot pick and choose between religious beliefs and practices. As Justice Sonia Sotomayor put it for the Court, the problem with the Wisconsin law was that it

explicitly differentiat[ed] between religions based on theological practices. Indeed, [an institution's] eligibility for the exemption ultimately turns on inherently religious choices (namely, whether to proselytize or serve only co-religionists)...

Much like a law exempting only those religious organizations that perform baptisms or worship on Sundays, an exemption that requires proselytization or exclusive service of co-religionists establishes a preference for certain religions based on the commands of their religious doctrine.

In short, Wisconsin's denial of a religious exemption for Catholic Charities, like New York's denial of one to the Albany Catholic Diocese and other religious institutions, was based on unconstitutional criteria. It was effectively based on whether the state viewed the institution's religious practices to be religious enough--i.e., whether they fit the state's notion of religion.

New York's narrow religious exemption--to which the Albany Catholic Diocese was not entitled--similarly picks and chooses between religious beliefs and practices and similarly violates 1st Amendment religious freedom. The state itself acknowledged this in its final brief to the Supreme Court after the Court's Wisconsin decision:

[W] agree that, in light of the Catholic Charities opinion, some of the subject accommodation’s criteria are likely unconstitutional as applied to at least some of the petitioners in this case...It is possible that the First Amendment challenge here could be resolved by extending the accommodation at issue to petitioners, or perhaps by simply severing objectionable aspects of the criteria.

So, it is now back to the Court of Appeals. New York's high court must now ensure that the exemptions from the abortion mandate are expanded to include religiously objecting institutions, without any unconstitutional picking and choosing based on what religious institutions are religious enough. 

Let's be absolutely clear. This has nothing to do with whether one favors a woman's right to choose and the broader right of bodily integrity. Which I do, and strongly so. Instead, this has to do with how serious we are about protecting a fundamental constitutional right against government interference, and specifically, the need for freedom of religion and conscience in a free society.

Finally, let's place all this back and forth about government interference with religious freedom, religious objections, and the denial of religious exemptions in context. This continuing, seemingly incessant difficulty and confusion in religious liberty cases. A predominant cause, if not the predominant one, is Justice Antonin Scalia's opinion for the Supreme Court in (Employment Division of...) Oregon  v. Smith, 1990. The Court held that the Indian Tribe in question was not entitled to an exemption from an Oregon anti-drug law, so they could continue to use peyote in their concededly sincere religious rituals. 

Whatever one thinks of the bottom-line decision in the case, the rule announced by Scalia to govern interference with religious freedom is an outrage. The Court did not hold that the state had a compelling reason to outlaw hallucinating drugs--that's what Justice O'Connor argued in a concurring opinion. Rather, Scalia's opinion for the Court asserted that the Constitution does not protect freedom of religion against an "otherwise valid law." So, unless a law violates some other constitutional right or invidiously discriminates, that law overrides the fundamental constitutional right of religious free exercise.

As O'Connor elaborated in her separate opinion, Scalia's opinion was utterly dishonest and stripped religious liberty of the traditional protection afforded to fundamental constitutional rights. Scalia denied that strict scrutiny applied to 1st Amendment free exercise of religion--i.e., the basic constitutional principle that the government must justify its interference with any fundamental right by proving that it is necessary to achieve a compelling interest--e.g., necessary for national security, to protect against an epidemic, military discipline, and the like. He also claimed that the Court had never granted religious exemptions to an otherwise valid law. Both of those assertions were lies. Period.

As a result, although several Justices want Oregon v. Smith overruled, the Court has to do end runs around that decision. It does so, for example, by finding some discrimination in the law in question (like the Court just did in the Wisconsin case), or by finding that a law is invalid only because it violates free speech (like the Court did in the recent case involving a business owner who did not want to create a website for a same-sex marriage: 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 2023).

The Supreme Court should return to a straightforward strict scrutiny: if religious freedom is being abridged, the government should have to prove that 1) it has a compelling purpose and 2) it has no other way to achieve that purpose. That is the test the Court has used for a long time to protect other fundamental constitutional rights and to protect against racial discrimination.

If Oregon v. Smith is not bad enough, the New York Court of Appeals compounded the problem in this state in Catholic Charities v. Serio, 2006. (That case involved religious objections to the state's contraceptive insurance mandate.) Not only did the Court of Appeals discard strict scrutiny protection for free exercise of religion, just like Scalia did in Smith. Beyond that, New York's high court discarded any requirement that the government had to justify its abridgment of religious liberty. Instead, it ruled that the religious objector must justify his complaint. The religious objector, the Court of Appeals held, bears the burden of proving that the law's interference with the objector's religious liberty is unreasonable. Another complete reversal of traditional constitutional protection of fundamental rights.

These two decisions, the ruling in Scalia's Smith opinion and the Court of Appeals ruling in Catholic Charities, have left the constitutional right of religious liberty adrift and left each of the two courts with a tortured jurisprudence for dealing with violations of one of our most basic rights.

The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals need to overrule these atrocious precedents.

Disclosure: I have been providing whatever small assistance and advice I can on behalf of the Albany Diocese and Albany Catholic Charities.   

Supremely Awful Arguments: Constitutional Nonsense (Part 2)

It's not mentioned in the Constitution

(A delay in getting to this one. But, come on: the Saratoga meet!
The Whitney, the Jim Dandy, the Alabama, the Travers, the Woodward, plus, plus, plus.)

So, "It's not mentioned in the Constitution."
Another one we hear all the time.

This one may even be worse than "Leave it to the states" or "to the people." (See Part 1.)
At least those arguments appeal to sentiments of federalism and democracy.
"It's not mentioned" simply appeals to ignorance.
Ignorance about the Constitution itself. About the Bill of Rights. About the very notion of free government.

We hear it whenever the Supreme Court protects a right or liberty--i.e., what the Court rules to be a right or liberty--that isn't specifically identified in the Constitution.
Those who disagree with the decision, be they talk radio hosts or "expert" commentators or Justices themselves, will parrot this one.
It's utter nonsense.

Indeed, the only virtue in this supremely awful argument is that it's bi-partisan and bi-ideological.
Conservative Republicans dredge this one up whenever an unexplicit right they don't like is protected by the Court--e.g., the right of privacy, the right to choose, Miranda warnings, etc.
And liberal Democrats resort to it when the Court protects some unspecified right that they disfavor--e.g., campaign spending, business freedoms, individual gun rights unconnected to state militias, etc.

But whenever the argument is raised, and whoever raises it, it's utter nonsense.

Let's consider the recent Obergefell v. Hodges decision recognizing the equal right of same-sex couples to marry.

"The right to same-sex marriage is not mentioned in the Constitution."
That's what we've heard from those who disagree with the decision, including some of the dissenting Justices.
The correct response to them should be, "Yes, and therefore what?"

The right to marry, itself, isn't mentioned--opposite or same sex.
The right to choose who to marry is not mentioned--opposite or same sex.
The right of a married couple to have sex is not mentioned.
The right of a married couple to have children is not mentioned.
The right of a married couple to raise their children--same.
The right of a married couple to seek advice about raising their children--same.
The right of a married couple, or anyone else, to have friends--same.
To join a group--same.
To have friendly gatherings--same.
Even to have family gatherings--same.
Etc., etc., etc.

Would anyone doubt that all of those are pretty basic rights?
Essential aspects to life in a free society?
Would anyone think that government in America should be permitted to deny them with impunity?
Deny them without some very very strong reason, like public health or safety or some other societal necessity?
Even though none of those rights are mentioned in the Constitution?
Even though none of them are even implied?

Well, except for the word "liberty."
That word is in the Constitution a few times.
But nothing more specific than that to refer to any of those unmentioned rights.

Benjamin Cardozo helped explain the notion of basic rights--mentioned or unmentioned--in the Supreme Court's 1937 decision in Palko v. Connecticut. His opinion is the foundational expression in American law for determining which rights are "fundamental" and, therefore, constitutionally protected from violation by any government--federal, state, or municipal.

The critical point, as Cardozo put it, is whether a claimed right is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Whether a claimed right is "essential" to a free and just society.
Not whether it happens to be one of the few guarantees actually listed in the Bill of rights.

Indeed, we nearly didn't have a Bill of Rights because of fear that the "it's not listed" or "it's not mentioned" argument would be raised in the future. The Founders and Framers were worried that, by listing some rights, those freedoms that were left unspecified might later be denied.

Yes, ultimately the arguments favoring a Bill of Rights--e.g., that a partial list was better than none at all--won the day. (See e.g., Jefferson's correspondence with Madison on the subject of a "declaration of rights.")
But the fears about the "it's not mentioned" argument have become reality.
That argument is precisely the nonsense we hear regularly about rights not specified in the Bill of Rights.

But the "it's not mentioned" argument  is even worse than the foregoing suggests.
In an effort to foreclose such an argument, a provision was added to the Bill of Rights. The 9th Amendment. That addition makes clear, in no uncertain terms, that the list of rights specified in the Constitution is necessarily very limited, and that unlisted rights are not to be denied.
(9th Amendment: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.")

This was James Madison's attempt to put a nail in the coffin of the "it's not mentioned" argument.
It was his more delicate way of saying that that supremely awful argument is utter nonsense.

Of course, not every right that might be claimed is deserving of constitutional recognition and protection--i.e., is implicit in and essential to the American scheme of liberty.
But the fact that such a right is not "enumerat[ed] in the Constitution" is irrelevant.

Now, before concluding, let's be clear that the "it's not mentioned" argument is not the sole province of conservatives and Republicans. Liberals and Democrats resort to this utter nonsense as well.

Let's take campaign spending.
The dreaded Citizens United decision.
Right or wrong, wise or foolish, the fact that spending money on political campaigns or issues is unmentioned in the Constitution is itself irrelevant.

Yes, the 1st Amendment speaks of free "speech." And spending money on political campaigns or issues is not speech.
No, it certainly is not.
But picketing--e.g., to protest a company's low wages--is similarly not mentioned in the Constitution, nor is it exactly speech either.
Marching--e.g., against the Boy Scouts' or other private organizations' discrimination against gays and lesbians--is not mentioned and not exactly speech.
Wearing some symbol--e.g., a black armband to protest war or a red ribbon to support AIDS research--is not mentioned and not exactly speech.
Burning the American flag--for whatever reason--is not mentioned and not exactly speech.
Etc., etc., etc.

Yes, all of those activities are engaged in for the purpose of expressing support or opposition or other opinions.
But the terms "expression"and "activity"are nowhere to be found in the 1st Amendment.
It specifies only "speech."

Well, it might be asserted, but aren't all those "expressive activities" kind of part of the broad notion and purpose and principle of free speech?
Indeed!
And so is spending money to produce a political documentary--just like the one at issue in Citizens United.
And so is spending money in support of a political party or candidate.
They are ways of expressing one's views, akin to speech.

To be sure, there may be some very strong arguments for limiting such political spending.
But not because "it's not mentioned."

There are strong reasons for limiting or prohibiting some expressive activities.
For some, the reasons are clear--e.g., setting fire to property to express opposition to the owner's bigotry or to police brutality.
But the fact that picketing and marching and wearing a symbol and burning the flag--and campaign spending--do not happen to be specifically mentioned in the Constitution is a wholly illegitimate reason for rejecting a claim that they are, or ought to be, protected constitutional rights.

Regardless of the possible reasons for limiting or prohibiting certain expressive activities, the "it's not mentioned" argument is not one of them. That argument, whether applied to expressive activities or the right to privacy or any other unspecified right, is utter nonsense, devoid of historical or constitutional basis.
In fact, it's contrary to both.


Next up: a related supremely awful argument--"Textualism, literalism, or that's not exactly what it says."

Protecting Religious Liberty, Part 2 [presentation]

This is my attempt at free exercise of religion in a visual nutshell.

It's from a presentation I delivered at a recent panel on Protecting Religious Liberty. The event was co-sponsored by several student organizations at Albany Law School--the Christian Legal Society, the Cardozo Legal Society, and the Muslim Law Student Association--and me.
[The entire event, including the remarks of my knowledgeable and insightful fellow panelists, as well as the Q's & A's with the audience, is available on videocast. (Link below.)]

The presentation was intended as a quick opening primer. A 20 minute overview of that fundamental freedom which is enshrined in the 1st Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and in corresponding provisions of the constitutions of the states as well.

The presentation briefly traced the genesis of freedom of religion in American law. The evolution of that freedom in landmark Supreme Court decisions interpreting and applying the 1st Amendment. The startling about-face by the modern Court that has turned the constitutional guarantee on its head, and has left the protection of religious liberty diluted, uncertain, and erratic. And finally, the ongoing aftermath of a weakened constitutional protection.

An outline of the presentation would look like this:

• Thomas Jefferson and James Madison's struggle to protect religious freedom in Virginia
• Early Supreme Court decisions affording little protection to the Mormons and other religious minorities
• Subsequent Supreme Court landmarks recognizing religious liberty as a fundamental freedom, and protecting it from all restrictions except those necessary for the most compelling reasons
• Modern Supreme Court caselaw discarding those highly protective landmarks
• State high courts deciding whether to follow the Supreme Court's about-face or to adhere to more protective standards for religious liberty

Here is the power point accompaniment to that presentation:

(click to enlarge slide)

_____________________________
To view the complete slide presentation, open HERE.
(Then, for the best view, click File + Download, and Open the download.)

[The videocast of the entire event--again, including the remarks of my knowledgeable and insightful fellow panelists, as well as the Q's & A's with the audience--is accessible via this link. (https://vimeo.com/64143574. Password: Liberty2013 ) (The quality of the videocast is not very high.)]

Catholics, Contraceptives, and 2nd Class Religious Liberty

[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.
---Chief Justice Warren Burger, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 1973

We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law.
---Justice Antonin Scalia, Oregon v. Smith, 1990

We've been examining this issue for the last 2 posts. We discussed how the law of religious liberty has changed. How religious liberty has been demoted by the Supreme Court.

How free exercise of religion--i.e., the freedom to practice one's religion, to abide by one's religious convictions--was historically recognized as a fundamental right in this country. How it was strongly protected as such (along with free speech, free press, right to counsel in a criminal case, right to equal racial treatment, etc.) by the Court.

How government was not allowed to interfere with that right unless it had a very important reason for doing so, and had no other way to accomplish its purpose. In other words, unless the government really needed to and had no alternative.

That was basic constitutional law. Basic Supreme Court jurisprudence to protect rights considered essential to a free people. Rights that had always included religious liberty.

Along with other fundamental rights, free exercise of religion was considered "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"--to use Justice Benjamin Cardozo's immortal phrase from his 1937 opinion for the Court in Palko v. Connecticut. Yes, one of those truly indispensable rights about which it could be said--in Cardozo's words again--"neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."

Yes, that is the right included in the very first clause of the very first amendment of the national charter. That's a pretty good indication of where religious freedom fits in the constitutional hierarchy. And the Supreme Court treated religious liberty accordingly--at least for a while.

(For the previous discussions, see Catholics, Contraceptives, and the (current Supreme Court's) Constitution, March 2, 2012; Catholics, Contraceptives, and the Constitution, Feb. 26, 2012.)

But then an increasingly conservative, law and order Court decided that minority religions didn't need to be accommodated. That minority religions had to tolerate government's beliefs and practices--not vice versa. That minority religions could not interfere with decisions of the majority or with other government authority--not vice versa.

That minority religions had to make exceptions to their beliefs and practices in order to obey government; government no longer had to make exceptions to its laws or rules in order to obey the Constitution's guarantee of religious freedom. Henceforth, laws and other government rules trumped the constitutional right--not vice versa.

Yes, topsy-turvy. Easier. Clearer. Tidier. More convenient. But constitutionally upside down.

Let's finish this series of posts with a look at some of the religious liberty landmarks of the Supreme Court. Specifically, let's take a look at what the Court said about free exercise of religion and about the necessary restrictions that free exercise placed on government--and NOT vice versa.

Catholics, Contraceptives, and the (current Supreme Court's) Constitution

It used to be...

I hate to begin that way.

Whenever someone talks that way I get skeptical. Much of the time, mention of how "it used to be" or of the "good old days" is followed by nonsense. Too often it means the days before civil rights, before equal protection for women, before the law treated gays and lesbians with some semblance of human dignity, before the "activist" Supreme Court outlawed racial segregation and made the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. Yep, America was sure a better place before that time!

No, I'm not talking about any such nonsense. I am talking about how free exercise of religion used to be protected as a fundamental right. As one of those important constitutional rights along with free speech, free press, right to assemble, right to counsel, right against forced confessions, right to a fair trial, right to have a family, right to raise your children, etc. Yes, I'm talking about how free exercise of religion, guaranteed in no uncertain terms in the 1st Amendment, used to be protected.

Because it isn't any more. No it isn't. Not under current Supreme Court case law.

Whatever one thinks about the mandate for contraceptive and morning-after coverage, whatever one thinks about any law or government regulation that interferes with freedom of religion, it is modern Supreme Court case law that has stripped religious freedom of the protection provided for every other fundamental constitutional right. Yes, stripped of the protection given speech, press, assembly, counsel, parenting, etc.


This is hard to believe. Very. But this is no exaggeration. This blog is not talk radio.

Every constitutional rights scholar knows this. Some may even agree that religious freedom should be treated as a 2nd class right. Most would adamantly disagree. But agree or disagree, everyone who teaches, or studies, or practices in the field of constitutional rights knows this to be true. 1st Amendment free exercise of religion is treated as an annoyance, not a fundamental right, under recent Supreme Court decisions.

And no. This is not the result of a liberal Supreme Court. No, this is not the result of an increasingly secular Court that disparages religion.

No, this is, instead, the result of conservative Justices who viewed a minority religion as a nuisance. Who viewed the religious liberty of a minority religion as an affront to the majority's preferred legal order. Who viewed the religious objections of minority religions as invitations to chaos. And who, consistent with that view, ruled that a law's infringement on, or disregard for, religious freedom is virtually irrelevant to the law's validity.