Here's Vin [me] interviewed on Capital Tonight with Liz Benjamin, on the evening of the first day of oral arguments at the Court on Obamacare.
It's my recap of the issues before the Court, and some discussion of the Justices, as well as my predicted outcome--i.e., to uphold!
http://www.capitaltonight.com/2012/03/albany-laws-bonventre-talks-supreme-court-and-obamacare/
Research & Commentary on the Supreme Court, the New York Court of Appeals, More
Monday, March 26, 2012
Monday, March 19, 2012
NY Court of Appeals: The Dissenting Dynamics Continue Under Lippman [and graphs are back!]
It's no fluke. Apparently not an aberration at all. Not even simply a court finding its way with a new Chief Judge.
The rise in dissents that we saw when Jonathan Lippman assumed the center seat at New York's highest court has persisted. We discussed the increased dissents early on in this blog. The New York Times even weighed in.
Chief Judge Lippman himself made clear that his emphasis was quite different than that of his predecessor, Judith Kaye, who prized decisions where the judges spoke with one voice. As he told the Times' William Glaberson : "I am a result oriented person, and the result I am looking for is not necessarily unanimity."
Indeed! Unanimity has certainly taken a back seat under Lippman. Take a look.
The dynamics of dissent, of open discussion of differences of opinion, has persisted. It is not just a blip. It has been a hallmark of the Lippman Court. A pretty sharp contrast with the Court under Kaye.
What began in the first 12 months of Lippman's tenure as Chief Judge, has developed into a lasting characteristic of his Court. A characteristic that has become even more pronounced. By the end of the last full calendar year, the number of decisions with dissent had more than doubled the number for the Court under Kaye.
The rise in dissents that we saw when Jonathan Lippman assumed the center seat at New York's highest court has persisted. We discussed the increased dissents early on in this blog. The New York Times even weighed in.
Chief Judge Lippman himself made clear that his emphasis was quite different than that of his predecessor, Judith Kaye, who prized decisions where the judges spoke with one voice. As he told the Times' William Glaberson : "I am a result oriented person, and the result I am looking for is not necessarily unanimity."
Indeed! Unanimity has certainly taken a back seat under Lippman. Take a look.
(click graphs to enlarge)
As the above graph shows, divided decisions are unquestionably on the rise. And dramatically so. The number of decisions with at least one judge dissenting has increased, and has continued to do so.The dynamics of dissent, of open discussion of differences of opinion, has persisted. It is not just a blip. It has been a hallmark of the Lippman Court. A pretty sharp contrast with the Court under Kaye.
What began in the first 12 months of Lippman's tenure as Chief Judge, has developed into a lasting characteristic of his Court. A characteristic that has become even more pronounced. By the end of the last full calendar year, the number of decisions with dissent had more than doubled the number for the Court under Kaye.
Thursday, March 15, 2012
Catholics, Contraceptives, and 2nd Class Religious Liberty
[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.
---Chief Justice Warren Burger, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 1973
We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law.
---Justice Antonin Scalia, Oregon v. Smith, 1990
We've been examining this issue for the last 2 posts. We discussed how the law of religious liberty has changed. How religious liberty has been demoted by the Supreme Court.
How free exercise of religion--i.e., the freedom to practice one's religion, to abide by one's religious convictions--was historically recognized as a fundamental right in this country. How it was strongly protected as such (along with free speech, free press, right to counsel in a criminal case, right to equal racial treatment, etc.) by the Court.
How government was not allowed to interfere with that right unless it had a very important reason for doing so, and had no other way to accomplish its purpose. In other words, unless the government really needed to and had no alternative.
That was basic constitutional law. Basic Supreme Court jurisprudence to protect rights considered essential to a free people. Rights that had always included religious liberty.
Along with other fundamental rights, free exercise of religion was considered "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"--to use Justice Benjamin Cardozo's immortal phrase from his 1937 opinion for the Court in Palko v. Connecticut. Yes, one of those truly indispensable rights about which it could be said--in Cardozo's words again--"neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."
Yes, that is the right included in the very first clause of the very first amendment of the national charter. That's a pretty good indication of where religious freedom fits in the constitutional hierarchy. And the Supreme Court treated religious liberty accordingly--at least for a while.
(For the previous discussions, see Catholics, Contraceptives, and the (current Supreme Court's) Constitution, March 2, 2012; Catholics, Contraceptives, and the Constitution, Feb. 26, 2012.)
But then an increasingly conservative, law and order Court decided that minority religions didn't need to be accommodated. That minority religions had to tolerate government's beliefs and practices--not vice versa. That minority religions could not interfere with decisions of the majority or with other government authority--not vice versa.
That minority religions had to make exceptions to their beliefs and practices in order to obey government; government no longer had to make exceptions to its laws or rules in order to obey the Constitution's guarantee of religious freedom. Henceforth, laws and other government rules trumped the constitutional right--not vice versa.
Yes, topsy-turvy. Easier. Clearer. Tidier. More convenient. But constitutionally upside down.
Let's finish this series of posts with a look at some of the religious liberty landmarks of the Supreme Court. Specifically, let's take a look at what the Court said about free exercise of religion and about the necessary restrictions that free exercise placed on government--and NOT vice versa.
How free exercise of religion--i.e., the freedom to practice one's religion, to abide by one's religious convictions--was historically recognized as a fundamental right in this country. How it was strongly protected as such (along with free speech, free press, right to counsel in a criminal case, right to equal racial treatment, etc.) by the Court.
How government was not allowed to interfere with that right unless it had a very important reason for doing so, and had no other way to accomplish its purpose. In other words, unless the government really needed to and had no alternative.
That was basic constitutional law. Basic Supreme Court jurisprudence to protect rights considered essential to a free people. Rights that had always included religious liberty.
Along with other fundamental rights, free exercise of religion was considered "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"--to use Justice Benjamin Cardozo's immortal phrase from his 1937 opinion for the Court in Palko v. Connecticut. Yes, one of those truly indispensable rights about which it could be said--in Cardozo's words again--"neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."Yes, that is the right included in the very first clause of the very first amendment of the national charter. That's a pretty good indication of where religious freedom fits in the constitutional hierarchy. And the Supreme Court treated religious liberty accordingly--at least for a while.
(For the previous discussions, see Catholics, Contraceptives, and the (current Supreme Court's) Constitution, March 2, 2012; Catholics, Contraceptives, and the Constitution, Feb. 26, 2012.)
But then an increasingly conservative, law and order Court decided that minority religions didn't need to be accommodated. That minority religions had to tolerate government's beliefs and practices--not vice versa. That minority religions could not interfere with decisions of the majority or with other government authority--not vice versa.
That minority religions had to make exceptions to their beliefs and practices in order to obey government; government no longer had to make exceptions to its laws or rules in order to obey the Constitution's guarantee of religious freedom. Henceforth, laws and other government rules trumped the constitutional right--not vice versa.
Yes, topsy-turvy. Easier. Clearer. Tidier. More convenient. But constitutionally upside down.
Let's finish this series of posts with a look at some of the religious liberty landmarks of the Supreme Court. Specifically, let's take a look at what the Court said about free exercise of religion and about the necessary restrictions that free exercise placed on government--and NOT vice versa.
Friday, March 2, 2012
Catholics, Contraceptives, and the (current Supreme Court's) Constitution
It used to be...
Every constitutional rights scholar knows this. Some may even agree that religious freedom should be treated as a 2nd class right. Most would adamantly disagree. But agree or disagree, everyone who teaches, or studies, or practices in the field of constitutional rights knows this to be true. 1st Amendment free exercise of religion is treated as an annoyance, not a fundamental right, under recent Supreme Court decisions.
I hate to begin that way.
Whenever someone talks that way I get skeptical. Much of the time, mention of how "it used to be" or of the "good old days" is followed by nonsense. Too often it means the days before civil rights, before equal protection for women, before the law treated gays and lesbians with some semblance of human dignity, before the "activist" Supreme Court outlawed racial segregation and made the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. Yep, America was sure a better place before that time!
No, I'm not talking about any such nonsense. I am talking about how free exercise of religion used to be protected as a fundamental right. As one of those important constitutional rights along with free speech, free press, right to assemble, right to counsel, right against forced confessions, right to a fair trial, right to have a family, right to raise your children, etc. Yes, I'm talking about how free exercise of religion, guaranteed in no uncertain terms in the 1st Amendment, used to be protected.
Because it isn't any more. No it isn't. Not under current Supreme Court case law.
Whatever one thinks about the mandate for contraceptive and morning-after coverage, whatever one thinks about any law or government regulation that interferes with freedom of religion, it is modern Supreme Court case law that has stripped religious freedom of the protection provided for every other fundamental constitutional right. Yes, stripped of the protection given speech, press, assembly, counsel, parenting, etc.
This is hard to believe. Very. But this is no exaggeration. This blog is not talk radio.
This is hard to believe. Very. But this is no exaggeration. This blog is not talk radio.
Every constitutional rights scholar knows this. Some may even agree that religious freedom should be treated as a 2nd class right. Most would adamantly disagree. But agree or disagree, everyone who teaches, or studies, or practices in the field of constitutional rights knows this to be true. 1st Amendment free exercise of religion is treated as an annoyance, not a fundamental right, under recent Supreme Court decisions.
And no. This is not the result of a liberal Supreme Court. No, this is not the result of an increasingly secular Court that disparages religion.
No, this is, instead, the result of conservative Justices who viewed a minority religion as a nuisance. Who viewed the religious liberty of a minority religion as an affront to the majority's preferred legal order. Who viewed the religious objections of minority religions as invitations to chaos. And who, consistent with that view, ruled that a law's infringement on, or disregard for, religious freedom is virtually irrelevant to the law's validity.
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