Monday, June 29, 2015

Update--Supremely Polarized: Partisanship Continues to Prevail

(We'll return to the Recaps--last week's marriage decision and then today's on lethal injection. But first, let's update last week's "Supremely Polarized" post.)
We've discussed and documented the politically partisan voting on the current Supreme Court quite a bit on New York Court Watcher. We did so in a lengthy series in 2012. And a few days ago--with all the decisions released since then, it seems like years--we surveyed the Justices' voting in some of the tough, controversial cases already decided this term. (See Supremely Polarized: Partisanship Continues to Prevail.)

Let's now update that survey. In reviewing the list of decisions and the repeated line-ups among the Justices, ask yourself again: are they voting like politically neutral, objective judges, or like partisan politicians? Like independent minded jurists or political party faithfuls?
Texas Dept. of Housing v. Inclusive Communities Project, ruled that a claim of racial discrimination in housing may be based on "disparate impact" (i.e., harmful results) as opposed to a showing of intentionally discriminatory treatment.
5 (Kennedy [wrote Court's opinion] + Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan)versus
4 (Alito [wrote dissent] + Roberts, Scalia, Thomas)
Obergefell v. Hodges, ruled that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry.
5 (Kennedy + Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan)
versus
4 (Roberts + Scalia, Thomas, Alito)
Glossip v. Gross, ruled that lethal injection with the sedative midazolam has not been shown to create a significant risk of serious pain in violation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
5 (Roberts + Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito)
versus
4 (Sotomayor + Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan)
Arizona Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, upheld the popularly voted initiative that created an independent commission to replace the legislature in deciding the state's voting districts.
5 (Ginsburg + Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan)
versus
4 ( Roberts + Scalia, Thomas, Alito)
Michigan v. EPA, ruled that the Environmental Protection Agency must consider the cost of compliance when regulating the hazardous pollutants emitted from power plants.
5 (Scalia + RobertsKennedy, Thomas, Alito)
versus
4 (Kagan + Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor)
In all fairness, let's add:
King v. Burwell, ruled that under the Affordable Care Act ("Obamacare") tax subsidies are available for purchases of insurance on federal exchanges, not only on exchanges actually established by a state.
6 (Roberts + Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan)
versus
3 ( Scalia + Thomas, Alito)
So there are the most recent decisions of the Court--the tough ones, with controversial issues.

Note that every case, but one, was divided 5-4 along politically partisan lines, with Justice Kennedy as the deciding vote.
In the one exception, King v. Burwell, the Obamacare subsidies case, Chief Justice Roberts joined Kennedy and the liberals, and wrote the opinion for the 6 Justice majority. But even in that case, all 4 Democratic liberals voted together in the majority, and the 3 most conservative Republican Justices voted together in dissent.

As I asked at the outset: are the Justices voting like politically neutral, objective judges, or like partisan politicians? Like independent minded jurists or political party faithfuls?
With an occasional exception, the answer seems obvious.

For a complete list of of these decisions--combining those above with those listed in the previous post--see the post below this one. (By electronic magic, it will appear as if posted prior to this one!)

(The combined list) Update--Supremely Polarized: Partisanship Continues to Prevail

Here's the complete list, combining those from Supremely Polarized: Partisanship Continues to Prevail and the Update.
(As in those previous posts, the Democratic Justices are in blue, the Republicans in red, and Kennedy in purple. (How clever.)

Gotta say it one more time: voting like judges or partisan politicians?
The list:
Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, upheld the claim of racial gerrymandering.
5 (Breyer [wrote Court's opinion] + Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan) versus
4 (Scalia [wrote dissent] + Roberts, Thomas, Alito
Kerry v. Din, upheld the visa denial to a citizen's spouse without any judicial review.
5 (Scalia + Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito) versus
4 (Breyer + Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan
Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, upheld the state's refusal to allow a Confederate flag design on vanity license plates.
5 (Breyer + Thomas, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan) versus
4 (Alito + Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy
Brumfield v. Cain, ruled that the death penalty defendant was entitled to a mental disability hearing.
5 (Sotomayor + Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan) versus
4 (Thomas + Roberts, Scalia, Alito
Davis v. Ayala, ruled that the death penalty defendant suffered no prejudice when trial judge permitted the prosecution--in the absence of the defense counsel--to offer race-neutral reasons for removing several jurors.
5 (Alito + Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas) versus
4 (Sotomayor + Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, ruled that force used by jail officials on a pre-trial detainee must be objectively reasonable.
5 (Breyer + Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan) versus
(Scalia + Roberts, Thomas, Alito)
Los Angeles v. Patel, invalidated a local law that permitted officials to search hotel guest registries without a warrant or the hotel's consent, and unannounced.
(Sotomayor +  Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan) versus
4 (Scalia + Roberts, Thomas, Alito)
Texas Dept. of Housing v. Inclusive Communities Project, ruled that a claim of racial discrimination in housing may be based on "disparate impact" (i.e., harmful results) as opposed to a showing of intentionally discriminatory treatment.
5 (Kennedy [wrote Court's opinion] + Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan)versus
4 (Alito [wrote dissent] + Roberts, Scalia, Thomas)
Obergefell v. Hodges, ruled that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry.
5 (Kennedy + Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan)
versus
4 (Roberts + Scalia, Thomas, Alito)
Glossip v. Gross, ruled that lethal injection with the sedative midazolam has not been shown to create a significant risk of serious pain in violation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
5 (Roberts + Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito)
versus
4 (Sotomayor + Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan)
Arizona Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, upheld the popularly voted initiative that created an independent commission to replace the legislature in deciding the state's voting districts.
5 (Ginsburg + Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan)
versus
4 ( Roberts + Scalia, Thomas, Alito)
Michigan v. EPA, ruled that the Environmental Protection Agency must consider the cost of compliance when regulating the hazardous pollutants emitted from power plants.
5 (Scalia + RobertsKennedy, Thomas, Alito)
versus
4 (Kagan + Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor)
In all fairness, let's add:
King v. Burwell, ruled that under the Affordable Care Act ("Obamacare") tax subsidies are available for purchases of insurance on federal exchanges, not only on exchanges actually established by a state.
6 (Roberts + Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan)
versus
3 ( Scalia + Thomas, Alito)
And if the foregoing isn't enough, the Court today ordered a halt ( a "stay") of the Texas laws that severely restricted the availability of abortions. Uhhh, by a 5-4 vote: Kennedy + the 4 liberals versus Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. ("ORDER IN PENDING CASE,  WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH, ET AL. V. COLE, COMM'R, TX DHS.)

A dreadfully partisan court.

Saturday, June 27, 2015

Obamacare Subsidies Decision: Recap (part 2: the video)

As an appendix to the Recap on the immediately preceding post from earlier today, here's an interview with Liz Benjamin on her Capital Tonight.

Liz questions me about the Obamacare subsidies decision and about the housing discrimination case the Court decided the same day. She then turns to the recently announced retirement of New York Court of Appeals Judge Susan Read, and the dramatic change in the high court over the course of a few years--with Governor Andrew Cuomo being able to remake its entire membership.

Here's the link:
The US Supreme Court delivered a huge victory to President Obama today, upholding a key part of the Affordable Care Act.  That decision means millions of Americans across the country who enrolled through state health exchanges will not lose their insurance. Vin Bonventre from Albany Law School joined us to discuss.
Link:  http://www.twcnews.com/nys/capital-region/capital-tonight-interviews/2015/06/25/vin-bonventre.html

Obamacare Subsidies Decision: Recap

(Friday's marriage decision...Must be honest: Alleluia!
We'll recap that in the next post.
Well, a later post.)

We previewed the Obamacare subsidies case a couple of weeks ago:
Supreme Blockbusters Coming: Marriage, Obamacare, Execution, & Confederate Flag (Part 2--Obamacare)
[BTW, called it! Both the outcome and the voting line-up. Of course, if you make predictions, every once in a while you'll get one right.]

Here's a recap of the specifics of the decision in King v. Burwell:

Decision
  • Tax subsidies are available for purchases of health insurance on the federally established markets ("exchanges"), as well as on those established by the states.
  • The vote was 6 to 3.
  • Majority: Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan [I.e., Roberts & Kennedy + the 4 liberals]
  • Dissent: Justice Scalia, joined by Thomas and Alito [I.e., the 3 most conservative Justices]
  •  [The decision basically saves the health insurance scheme under the Affordable Care Act (ACA "Obamacare"). Most insurance purchases under the law have been made through the federal exchanges because most states--under Republican control--have refused to set up their own state exchanges.]
Chief Justice Roberts' Opinion for the Court/Majority
  • The Massachusetts health insurance plan has succeeded in drastically expanding access to health care coverage [Roberts seems very positive about the Massachusetts plan, aka "Romneycare"]
  • The federal plan was modeled after that one
  • Essential to both plans is assistance to make insurance affordable to lower income purchasers
  • Under the ACA, the federal plan, states are authorized to establish exchanges, and the federal government is required to do so in states that don't
  • The "inartfully" drafted ACA provides that tax subsidies are available when insurance is purchased on "an Exchange established by the State"
  • Considering the entire law and its purpose, that provision must include what the law refers to as a federally established "such Exchange within the State" 
  • Otherwise, because the law restricts insurance purchases to an individual who "resides in the State that established the Exchange," purchases would not even be allowed on federally established exchanges and they would, thereby, serve no purpose whatsoever
  • Further, the unavailability of subsidies on federal exchanges would create "death spirals" in the health insurance markets that both the Massachusetts and federal plans were intended to avoid; the result would be "calamitous"

Justice Scalia's Opinion for the Dissenters

  • It is "quite absurd" to say that "Exchange established by the State" means "Exchange established by the State or the Federal Government"
  • We must presume that lawmakers mean the "natural and ordinary signification" of the words they use
  • The Court's majority has engaged in "somersaults of statutory interpretation" that will add confusion to "honest jurisprudence"
  • The majority's principle: "The Affordable Care Act must be saved"
  • The law should now be called "SCOTUScare"

To recap the recap:
1) Federal and state exchanges are to be treated equally--specifically for the availability of  tax subsidies for lower income purchasers of health insurance.
2) Roberts for the majority: "an exchange established by the state" should be interpreted in coordination with the entire law and its overriding purpose--hence, that phrase should be read to include a federal exchange established in a state that failed to set one up itself.
3) Scalia for the dissenters: the phrase means only what it says--no more, no less.

In the next--ummm, a later--post we'll recap the same-sex marriage decision.

Wednesday, June 24, 2015

Supremely Polarized: Partisanship Continues to Prevail

The divided Court.
Not along legal or jurisprudential lines--although there is some of that.
Not activism versus restraint, or any disagreement about the judicial role--though some of that too.
Not strict versus loose construction, or any interpretive methodology--though some of that as well.

But along political lines.
Partisan political lines.
Democratic versus Republican Justices--other than a Republican switching sides, usually Kennedy, in some cases.

As we await the blockbusters to come--on same-sex marriage and Obamacare subsidies--consider these ideologically charged decisions already decided this term:
Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, upheld the claim of racial gerrymandering.
5 (Breyer [wrote Court's opinion] + Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan) versus
4 (Scalia [wrote dissent] + Roberts, Thomas, Alito
Kerry v. Din, upheld the visa denial to a citizen's spouse without any judicial review.
5 (Scalia + Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito) versus
4 (Breyer + Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan
Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, upheld the state's refusal to allow a Confederate flag design on vanity license plates.
5 (Breyer + Thomas, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan) versus
4 (Alito + Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy
Brumfield v. Cain, ruled that the death penalty defendant was entitled to a mental disability hearing.
5 (Sotomayor + Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan) versus
4 (Thomas + Roberts, Scalia, Alito
Davis v. Ayala, ruled that the death penalty defendant suffered no prejudice when trial judge permitted the prosecution--in the absence of the defense counsel--to offer race-neutral reasons for removing several jurors.
5 (Alito + Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas) versus
4 (Sotomayor + Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, ruled that force used by jail officials on a pre-trial detainee must be objectively reasonable.
5 (Breyer + Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan) versus
4 (Scalia + Roberts, Thomas, Alito)
Los Angeles v. Patel, invalidated a local law that permitted officials to search hotel guest registries without a warrant or the hotel's consent, and unannounced.
5 (Sotomayor +  Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan) versus
4 (Scalia + Roberts, Thomas, Alito)
So, other than Kennedy who sometimes voted with the Democratic appointees (and Thomas, instead of Kennedy, in the Confederate flag case), the Justices--Democratic or Republican, liberal or conservative--voted along political party lines in these ideologically charged cases.
In fact, in every case, every Democratic-appointed Justice....

Point made without saying more?

(Correction: I mistakenly transposed the votes of Kennedy and Thomas in the Confederate flag case when I first posted this. It's  now corrected.)

Saturday, June 20, 2015

Intermezzo, for Our Dads and for Charleston

Yes, the "Intermezzo."
Hearing it on the radio today reminded me of my Dad.
From Mascagni's opera that takes place in Sicily, can there be anything more magnificent to offer for all our departed Dads on this Father's Day weekend?
Here's Pietro Mascagni's Intermezzo from Cavalleria Rusticana:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7OvsVSWB4TI

For Charleston, here's an offering from Mozart.
The story, apocryphal or not, is that the despondent genius returned to his room and this sublime sonata emerged from his despair.
Here's praying that, out of the "awful grace of God," something equally divine emerges from Charleston's and our nation's anguish.
Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Sonata for Piano and Violin in E minor K. 304 (2nd movement):
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QGyMr5nZ_r0

Happy Father's Day, and God bless our country.

Friday, June 19, 2015

Supreme Blockbusters Coming (Part 4--Confederate Flag [now decided])

The Court released its decision in the Confederate flag case Thursday morning while I was working on this post.
Of course, I would have correctly predicted the ruling.
Not really.

Seems that I was giving the Justices more credit for neutral decisionmaking than they deserve--and I don't think they deserve much to begin with.
Bottom line: the 4 liberal Justices voted against the Confederate flag; 4 of the 5 conservatives voted for it; Justice Thomas (the Court's sole African-American) voted with the liberals on this one.

Let's get to the case itself and the specific legal ruling:
Texas allows specialty (so-called "vanity") license plates as selected and even designed by motorists.
The Sons of Confederate Veterans (Confederate Sons), an organization honoring soldiers who fought for the South, wanted a specialty license plate with a design depicting the Confederate flag and identifying the organization.
Texas, through a board of its motor vehicles department, rejected the request.
The basis for the rejection was the board's standard that "it might be offensive to any member of the public."
The Confederate Sons claimed that the rejection was a violation of free speech.
The federal appeals court (i.e., the 5th Circuit) agreed with the Confederate Sons.
But the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and, instead, sided with Texas.
It did so by a 5-4 vote. (Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans, decided 6/18/2015.)
As already noted, all 4 liberal Democratic Justices (Ginsbug, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) supported the state's rejection of the Confederate flag design.Their 5th vote, making them the majority, came from the Court's only African-American, Justice Thomas. In the past, he has understandably made clear his strong hostility to symbols associated with racism.
The other 4 conservative Republican Justices all supported the Confederate Sons' claimed free speech right.

Hmmm.
Liberals all against the Confederate Sons; conservatives (except Thomas) for them.
Just another one of those coincidences.
Another one of many similar ones with this Court.

My own expectation was that the decision would be the opposite. And that the vote would be 6-3 or 7-2 in favor of free expression rights for the Confederate Sons. Or stated differently, against the state's right to engage in viewpoint discrimination.

I underestimated the ideological tug this case would exert on the Justices.
Not the tug for or against free expression rights.
But sympathy versus hostility for the Confederate flag and, maybe, for the Confederate Sons who wanted to display it.
Or perhaps it is entirely coincidental that the 4 liberal Justices weighed all the legal considerations--pro and con free speech--and just happened to reach a decision against the display of a Confederate flag design.
And entirely coincidental that 4 conservative Justices--only Thomas missing--would weigh the very same free speech considerations and just happen to reach a pro-Confederate flag decision.

Let's be real. What are the odds that these results are purely coincidental? That views and feelings about the Confederate flag, or about those who wanted to display it, played no part in the votes?

Now what about the actual legal/constitutional issue in this case, and the competing legal/constitutional arguments?

The question the case formally presented to the Court was whether the personally selected expressions on the specialty or "vanity" license plates are "government speech" (i.e., Texas speaking), or that of the motorists who selected or designed the special expressions for their plates.

If the specialty expressions are those of the state, then the state can pick and choose what it would like to say. A state could freely choose not to display a Confederate flag on its license plates--just as the Texas motor vehicles department chose not to do.
But if the specialty expressions are those of the motorists who selected or designed them, then their free speech rights are triggered. The motorists would be free to express their viewpoints--unless they involved obscenity, violence-incitement, or other unprotected speech.

So, are the personally selected expressions on the Texas specialty or "vanity" plates Texas speaking or the motorist speaking? That was the legal issue on which the Justices split.

The precedents, as one might expect, can support either position:
Pleasant Grove City v. Summun (2009)--the city, which accepted privately donated monuments for its park, had the right to reject a monument to the "Seven Aphorisms of the Summun Church." Held to be "government speech," 9-0 decision.
Rust v. Sullivan (1991)--the federal government, which provides medicaid for indigent health services, has the right to prohibit health care professionals providing such subsidized care from advising about abortion services. Held to be "government speech," 5-4.
Rosenberger v. University of Virginia (1995)--the state university, which funds student activities, could not refuse to fund an Evangelical Christian student group's religious magazine. Held to involve the student group's protected free speech, 5-4.
Wooley v. Maynard (1977)--the state, New Hampshire, could not stop Jehovah Witnesses from covering the state motto, "Live Free or Die," on the license plates on their cars. Held to involve the objectors' protected free speech, 6-3.

As noted in the dissenting opinion authored by Justice Alito, Texas had already allowed over 350 different logos and designs on specialty or "vanity" plates. They ranged from the names and logos of schools, colleges, universities, and countless organizations and sports teams (including out-of-state competitors of Texas teams), to favorite recreational activities, soft drinks, and foods.

Alito posed the question: Would anyone "really think that the sentiments reflected on these specialty or "vanity" plates are the views of the State of Texas and not those of the owners of the cars?"
I'm with Alito on this question at least, and I would have voted with him and Roberts, Scalia, and Kennedy on that particular point.
It seems a wholly unrealistic stretch to label the logos and designs, which are personally selected, by private motorists', and appear on the license plates on their own cars, to be the state speaking--"government speech."

Consider this.
There is currently another case in which North Carolina has allowed "Choose Life" on the specialty or "vanity" plates. But the state will not allow "Respect Choice." In short, it has allowed its motorists to display an anti-abortion viewpoint, but not a pro-choice one.
The federal appeals court (i.e., the 4th Circuit) unanimously disagreed with the state. It disagreed that this was a case involving "government speech." Instead, the court ruled that the state had violated the motorists' free speech rights by engaging in "blatant viewpoint discrimination." (ACLU v. Tata [2014].)

So how would the liberal Justices of the Supreme Court view the state's refusal to permit motorists to express pro-choice sentiments? Especially while the state allowed other motorists to express pro-life ones? Would the liberal Justices simply view the state's political viewpoint discrimination as valid "government speech," or would they recognize it as unconstitutionally favoring some free speech over others?

But, as they say, that's not the end of the story.

Finally, few people deplore the displaying of the Confederate flag more than I do. To me, as to others, it is a symbol of the fight to maintain slavery and of the later opposition to civil rights.
[Yeah, okay, it reflects "states rights"--to retain slavery and to continue racial segregation and discrimination.] And to me, and others, it persists as an expression of subtle and not-so-subtle racism and white supremacy, nostalgia for the pre-Civil War way of life in the South, and hatred for the "Northern aggression"that ended it--uhhhh, the "Northern aggression" that ended slavery and later imposed racial integration.

Bob Jones University v. U.S. (1983) is a case I believe is relevant and helpful here. In that case, the Supreme Court rejected the church-related university's claim for tax deductions. The Court did so because the university promoted and practiced beliefs of racial discrimination. Although such deductions were generally available to educational institutions, the Court ruled that the nation's fundamental policy against racial discrimination outweighed whatever religious liberty interests of the university were at stake.
[BTW, the Court's opinion was authored by conservative Nixon appointee, Chief Justice Warren Burger; the sole dissenter was William Rehnquist, who Reagan later appointed to succeed Burger as Chief.]

As in the Bob Jones case, it would seem that the Court in the Confederate flag case could have once again recognized a fundamental policy interest in eradicating vestiges of racial discrimination, segregation, and slavery--of hateful symbols that undermine the quest for greater racial harmony.
Instead of engaging in the fiction--absurd to me, as it was to Alito &co. in the dissent--that the personally selected and designed expressions on specialty or "vanity" license plates are the state speaking (the so-called "government speech"), why not simply recognize them for what they are? They are private expressions.

But they are private expressions on a government-sponsored forum--i.e., on the government-offered and sponsored specialty or "vanity" plates.

Free speech is not absolute, and the government need not sponsor speech--i.e., it need not produce and offer license plates--that celebrate or promote what is antithetical to fundamental policy values.
Government certainly need not offer or sponsor a forum for expression that promotes or celebrates hatred, violence, or other anti-social attitudes or conduct.
Individuals certainly have the right of free speech to express homophobia, xenophobia, misogyny, racism, and the like. But they have no right to have the government sponsor such expression on a government created and offered forum.

The dissent in Walker seems to have been right in concluding that the personally selected expressions on specialty or "vanity" plates is private expression, and not "government speech."
Nevertheless, it still seems that the the state's rejection of the Confederate flag design was valid.
But not because the personally selected expressions on these license plates are "government speech."
Rather, because the government need not sponsor expressions that promote or celebrate beliefs that are inimical to our fundamental national policies against racial discrimination, racial segregation, and slavery.
And again, let's be frank, the Confederate flag is tied to all of those.
Government surely need not assist in the display of a symbol that reflects all of those hateful institutions.

Instead of adopting the "this is 'government speech'"fiction--and not a very convincing one--the majority in the Confederate flag case should have acknowledged that the free speech rights of private expression were at issue. But that they were outweighed by the state's, and society's, fundamental policy interests.

Consider the implications for the North Carolina case previously mentioned--i.e., the state allowing "Choose Life" but disallowing "Respect Choice" on license plates.
Applying the "government speech" analysis of the Confederate flag case would result in upholding North Carolina's viewpoint discrimination against pro-choice expression.
On the other hand, recognizing that specialty or "vanity" plates entail private expression would result in prohibiting the state from abridging the free speech rights of pro-choice advocates.
To succeed, the state would need to demonstrate that there is some overriding fundamental policy against a woman's right to choose.
Of course the state could not do that, because the right to choose is a protected constitutional freedom.

One last thing.
The legal reasons a court adopts for reaching its decisions matter.
Often those reasons matter much more than the result in the particular case.
Those legal reasons are applied in all the cases that follow.
The Supreme Court majority's reasons in the Confederate flag case--i.e., "government speech"--will now be applied in many cases coming before federal and state courts and agencies around the country.
That is most unfortunate. Many of those results, like the reasons given in the Confederate flag case, will be wrong.
And lots of free speech--under the guise that it is "government speech"--will suffer.

Monday, June 15, 2015

Supreme Blockbusters Coming (Part 3--Lethal Injection)

Seven years ago, the Justices upheld lethal injection as a constitutional means of execution. A few weeks ago, they heard arguments in another lethal injection case. This one was precipitated by a number of botched procedures that resulted in extremely painful deaths.

Lethal-Injection Procedures (Glossip v. Gross)
In its 2008 decision in Baze v. Rees, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to death sentences carried out by injection with lethal drugs. The challenge was based upon the possibility that the procedures could cause serious pain if they were not properly followed.

By a vote of 7-2, the Justices held that such a possibility did not render execution by lethal injection unconstitutional. A mere possibility did not mean that such executions were "cruel and unusual" within the meaning of the 8th Amendment (or the 14th Amendment, as applied to the states). That decision is the "governing" precedent for this latest case.

But it's not so clear what that "governing" precedent actually established that's precedential. The lopsided vote in Baze is misleading. Despite being 7-2, it did not produce a majority rule or rationale. There were 7 separate opinions written, and collectively they asserted at least 3 different ways to analyze these death penalty cases.

The leading opinion, authored by Chief Justice Roberts, was joined only by Justices Kennedy and Alito. In that plurality opinion, Roberts surveyed past "cruel and unusual" decisions and concluded that a method of execution is unconstitutional if it entails an "intolerable risk" of "severe pain." Applying that test, he determined that the lethal injection procedure in that case was acceptable.

In an opinion by Justice Thomas, he and Justice Scalia made clear their view that only the most torturous, barbaric, and gratuitously excruciating punishments were "cruel and unusual." So only executions by burning alive, disemboweling, crucifixion, drawing and quartering, and the like would violate the constitution. Lethal injection was clearly acceptable to these two Justices.

In dissent, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Souter, argued that the test for "cruel and unusual" was whether the procedure created an "avoidable risk"of "unnecessary pain." They refused to approve lethal injection unless or until it was shown that the risk could not be avoided.
(Justices Stevens and Breyer each wrote a separate opinion. Stevens kind of agreed with Roberts. Breyer agreed with Ginsburg's test, but believed that lethal injection passed.)

So that's where the law, such as it is, stands.

Now in the current case, the question is about the use by Oklahoma (and some other states) of a particular 1st drug in a 3 drug protocol. The 2nd and 3rd drugs in the sequence stop the person's breathing and stop his heart. But it's the 1st drug administered that is supposed to anesthetize the person so that he is unconscious and feels no pain.

Because of a shortage of the commonly used 1st drug (in large measure because of the efforts of death penalty opponents), states like Oklahoma began to use an alternative. That drug is actually a sedative, not an anesthetic. In large enough doses, however, the so-called midazolam is supposed to be effective in inducing an unconscious state.

Nevertheless, in several executions, in a few different states, in which midazolam was used, the person was not rendered unconscious and, instead, suffered a gruesome and extremely painful death. Is that enough for the Court to rule that lethal injection with midazolam is unconstitutional?

Putting that question another way: is the apparent unreliability of the sedative midazolam--to induce unconsciousness and, thereby, to prevent an intensely painful execution--enough to persuade at least 5 Justices that lethal injection with that drug violates the constitutional prohibition against "cruel and unusual" punishment?

Let's consider the Justices and their possible votes.

First, there are the easiest ones. Scalia and Thomas, as we've already noted, believe that only punishments similar to disembowelment, burning alive, crucifixion, and drawing and quartering are prohibited by the Constitution. There's very little chance they will consider the unreliable or botched lethal injections sufficiently gruesome.

On the other hand, there are the liberals--Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Some of them are openly hostile to the death penalty. All of them seemed extremely skeptical at oral argument, if not utterly contemptuous of Oklahoma's defense of its lethal injection protocol. It's very likely that all 4 of these Justices will vote that what Oklahoma is doing is unconstitutional.

That leaves Roberts, Kennedy, and Alito. They joined together to form the plurality in the 2008 Baze case. It was they who stated that the test for "cruel and unusual" is whether there is an "intolerable risk" of "severe pain."

So is the risk with midazolam "intolerable?" Less subjective and amorphous than that, how great is the actual risk ? And how great must that risk be for Roberts or Kennedy or Alito to conclude that lethal injection with midazolam flunks their constitutional test?

At oral argument, Alito seemed quite unsympathetic to the claims against Oklahoma's use of that alternate drug. He seemed to blame the death penalty opponents for making the more reliable drugs so scarce. But would he really think that's a legitimate reason to uphold the use of the risky drug? Of a drug that risks seriously painful executions? It would be no surprise if he voted to approve Oklahoma's protocol.

As for Roberts and Kennedy, they expressed similar concerns to Alito's. But--at least from several reports of the oral arguments--neither seemed to be as openly hostile to death penalty opponents generally, or to be directing that hostility toward the opponents of the midazolam protocol as much as Alito.

Moreover, Kennedy has not been a staunch supporter of the death penalty. Indeed, he has occasionally joined the liberals to invalidate it in certain circumstances. The unreliability of using midazolam as an anesthetic might just nudge Kennedy over to the liberals in this case.

Roberts has also shown some ambivalence about the death penalty in the past. Not as much as Kennedy. But he is certainly nowhere near the camp of Scalia and Thomas.

So the bottom line on this one?
As with the same-sex marriage and Obamacare subsidies cases, the 4 liberals are virtually certain to vote on the same side and, in this case, to vote against Oklahoma's lethal injection protocol. And as in those other cases, they need just one more vote for a majority.
One thing's for sure: they will not get Scalia or Thomas.
And they will very likely not get Alito.
That's 4-3.

The most likely 5th vote for the liberals, if they're going to get one, is--no surprise here--Kennedy. He seemed to acknowledge at oral argument that the use of midazolam created much more risk than other drugs. Whether he will hold the shortage of more reliable anesthetics against the opponents of midazolam is, of course, anyone's guess. But Kennedy has never seemed as petty and belligerent as some others on the Court.

Roberts wouldn't be a shock if he applied his Baze standard and found midazolam to be too risky. Again, he is certainly no Scalia or Thomas. But, if I were the liberal Justices, I wouldn't count on him.

So the vote on this one, as on the cases we previously discussed, will likely be deeply split.
If I had to bet, I'd say 5-4--but I have no confidence whatsoever which way that will be.
(Ok, if I'm ordered from on high to say? Kennedy goes with the Libs.)


In the next post: the confederate flag on a license plate?

Saturday, June 13, 2015

Supreme Blockbusters Coming: Marriage, Obamacare, Execution, & Confederate Flag (Part 2--Obamacare)

Just as closely-watched and controversial as the same-sex marriage case is this year's challenge to Obamacare.

Health Insurance Subsidies (King v. Burwell)
The question before the Supreme Court involves the federal tax subsidies to help lower-income workers purchase health insurance. Are those subsidies available only where insurance is purchased through a state-established marketplace? Or through a federally established marketplace as well?

The rub?
Virtually every Republican controlled state has refused to set up a health insurance marketplace. This resistance to Obamacare (the Affordable Care Act) has resulted in marketplaces being established in those states by the federal government. Several million workers have purchased their insurance in those Republican states--through federal marketplaces, with the help of the federal subsidies.

Now the law does authorize the federal government to establish such marketplaces--termed "exchanges"--in states that refuse or otherwise fail to do so. In fact, the law says that the federal government "shall' do just that.
But, the law only mentions the federal subsidies when referring to purchases “through an Exchange established by the State." [My emphasis.] There is no additional reference specifying subsidies for purchases through a federally established exchange.

To be sure, this case can be viewed from different perspectives.

As a purely legalistic matter, this case is simply an issue of statutory construction. I.e., what is the correct way to read or "interpret" the very terms of the Affordable Care Act regarding the availability of those subsidies? So just the language of the law.

As a matter of politics, partisanship, and policy, the case is about the impact the decision will have on national health insurance coverage and, more specifically, on the Obama administration's effort to achieve that. I.e., what are the implications for those several million lower-income workers and their families who had to obtain health insurance through a federal exchange, because their Republican controlled state governments refused to establish one? And what are the implications for the very purpose of the law itself? So not just the language of the statute, but the consequences of the Court's decision as well.

Let's put the cards on the table. There will almost certainly be nonsense spouted by both the conservative and liberal Justices. As for pure statutory construction, the conservatives will insist that the law must mean that subsidies are available only for state exchanges because the law only mentions subsidies in a section speaking about such exchanges. The liberals will insist that the law must mean the opposite because the federal exchanges are established on behalf of states and, therefore, are supposed to be treated as state exchanges themselves.
Of course, neither is really so clear. The law doesn't necessarily mean either.

As for politics, partisanship, and policy, there will be no less nonsense. The conservatives will insist that the consequences of a decision should not be considered by the Court, only the law itself--and that clearly requires the invalidation of subsidies for federal exchanges. The liberals will insist that consequences must be considered in rendering a judicial decision--and that clearly requires the Court to uphold subsidies for federal exchanges as well. Both the conservatives and the liberals will present their respective positions as pure law, as neutral (non-ideological) judicial decision-making, as devoid of partisanship and politics.
Of course, none of the foregoing is clear--except that politics, partisanship, and ideology will indeed play a major role in the Justices' voting.

So where does that get us?
It's a virtual certainty that the 4 liberal Justices--Ginsberg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan--will vote to uphold subsidies for federal exchanges. As a matter of politics, partisanship, ideology, policy, etc., they undoubtedly support the expansion of health insurance coverage under Obamacare. They understand that the subsidies are essential to that expansion, Indeed the subsidies may well be essential to the very survival of Obamacare.

It's also a virtual certainty that among the 5 conservative Justices--Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito--at least some of them are so opposed to Obamacare and hostile to what the Obama administration has sought to accomplish, that they will vote to invalidate subsidies for the federal exchanges. As for the millions who will lose the subsidies and then lose their health insurance, some of these Justices either do not care or they believe that such consequences are not their concern in deciding the case. As for possibly crippling Obamacare, they might well be delighted.

But the conservative Justices are not as cohesive a group as are the liberals. And the liberals need only one of the conservative Justices to vote with them in order to sustain the subsidies for the federal exchanges--thereby, saving the health insurance purchased with those subsidies, as well as saving Obamacare itself.

It would seem likely that at least one of the conservatives--Chief Justice Roberts or Justice Kennedy--will be less partisan and ideological on this issue than the others. As for Roberts, he cast the deciding 5th vote in NIFB v. Sibelius (2012) to uphold the Affordable Care Act against constitutional challenge. And he is the Chief Justice.

As in that previous case, does the Chief Justice of the United States really want the Court he leads to look so hopelessly partisan that all the Democratic Justices vote to uphold a Democratic President's initiative, and all the Republican Justices vote against it? And as the Chief Justice, does he really want to be seen as the leader of a Court that effectively took health insurance away from millions of lower-income workers and their spouses and children? Does he really want to be seen as endorsing the concept that his Court ought to disregard the consequences of its decisions--regardless of how drastic?

As for Justice Kennedy, he oftentimes votes with the liberals on social issues, e.g., gay rights and the death penalty. Indeed, he sometimes raises the ire of his more conservative colleagues for being less of a true believer. Moreover, he is not an adherent of the notion that judicial decisions ought to be uninfluenced by their consequences.

On the other hand, in NIFB v. Sibelius, Kennedy did make plain his hostility to Obamacare in his joint dissenting opinion with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. So he may be less likely to vote with the liberals in this latest challenge to Obamacare than Roberts would be.

Of course, who really knows. But it does seem more likely than not that the decision will be the 4 liberals plus the Chief Justice (with a more outside chance of Kennedy) weighing the consequences and thus voting to uphold the subsidies for federal exchanges.
We'll see pretty soon.

Next up, the cases dealing with lethal injections and the confederate flag on license plates.

Friday, June 12, 2015

Supreme Blockbusters Coming: Marriage, Obamacare, Execution, & Confederate Flag (Part 1)

It's the end of the term. As usual, the Supreme Court has left the decisions in some of the biggest and most controversial cases till the end. Let's take a quick look at four of them.
[I tried to whittle the number down to a more magical 3, but my wife and I just couldn't pick which 1 of the 4 to cut.]

Same-Sex Marriage (Obergefell v. Hodges)
Are state laws that prohibit same-sex marriage unconstitutional?
More precisely, do state laws that permit only opposite-sex marriages violate the federal Constitution's 14th Amendment which guarantees "equal protection" (i.e., prohibits invidious discrimination) and "due process" (i.e., prohibits laws that are fundamentally unfair and requires that laws be based on some legitimate government reason).

Since the Supreme Court decided Lawrence v. Texas in 2003, invalidating state laws that criminalized homosexual intimacy [and, thereby, emerging from the cave], the nation's views on gay rights and equality have changed with astonishing speed. Ten years later, in United States v. Windsor, this Supreme Court invalidated that part of DOMA ( the federal so-called "Defense of Marriage Act") that limited federal marital benefits to opposite-sex couples. The Court held that there simply was no legitimate government purpose for denying those same benefits to legally married same-sex couples.

At this point in our history, virtually every federal court--trial or appellate--to have addressed the issue has ruled that laws banning same-sex marriage are unconstitutional. And same-sex marriage--by judicial decision or legislation--is now legal in 37 states. Beyond that, polls show that a strong majority of Americans believe that same-sex marriage should be legal.

How far behind are the Justices willing to be?
How far out of touch are the Justices?
How tied to past discriminatory views--let's put the cards on the table: hostile and prejudiced--are the Justices that they would fail to see that anti-same-sex marriage laws violate equal protection and that they serve absolutely no serious government purpose?

Yes there's culture.
Yes, tradition.
Yes, upbringing.
Yes, sincere religious belief.
But also yes, pure irrational and hateful bigotry.
And none of these are valid constitutional justifications for discriminatory laws.

Although the current Supreme Court is quite mediocre, even dreadful, it's quite unlikely that the Court will take a stance against history and against the most rudimentary sense of decency, fairness, and equality.

Certainly, the 4 liberals--Ginsberg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan--will vote for same-sex marriage. That means that only 1 vote--a single Justice--stands between constitutionally sanctioning same-sex marriage and returning to the cave.
[Sorry, but as a purely heterosexual male, I simply fail to see any serious reason whatsoever--except for historical, "savage" bigotry (to borrow from Reagan-appointed federal appeals Judge Richard Posner)--for sustaining bans on same-sex marriage.]

The deciding vote(s) will likely come from Justice Anthony Kennedy--the "homo lover," as he was referred to by some members of the Reagan administration who opposed his nomination to the Court. He has been consistent in his support of gay rights and equality.

And perhaps also from Chief Justice John Roberts. It is near inconceivable that a Supreme Court Chief Justice would elect to stand athwart the undeniable, intractable tide of history. Is that what he would want his legacy to be?

Of course, there are some Justices who view same-sex marriage as the fall of civilization. Perhaps even America's march straight to hell. And they will likely vote according to those beliefs.

We shall see. But it's reasonable to expect a 5-4 or 6-3 decision in favor of same-sex marriage.

Next up: the Obamacare subsidies case.

Monday, June 8, 2015

Ignorance of the Law--by the Police--IS an Excuse (Part 6: GUTHRIE's Implications)

The majority opinion in Guthrie is cause for concern about independent decisionmaking at New York's highest court--about the Court's tradition of protecting fundamental rights and liberties on the basis of adequate and independent state law.

Historically, the Court of Appeals has not tied itself to whatever minimum federal protections might be set by the Supreme Court.
It has understood its right and duty to exercise its own judgment, as the final arbiter of its own state law. (See e.g., the Court's decisions excerpted in part 5.)

No, the Court has not always been true to that tradition.
The Court has sometimes lost its footing.
It did so, for example, in the late 1980's and early 1990's.
Indeed, in heated, competing opinions during those years, the Court seemed to be struggling with the very notion of having either a right or duty to exercise its own independent judgment.

Now, in the majority opinion in Guthrie, there are implications that the Court might have lost its footing again.
Not because of the bottom-line ruling in the case. (See part 4.)
But because of the Court's over-reliance on the Supreme Court's Heien decision to reach a decision about state search and seizure law.
And, beyond that, because of the Court's resort to the overly-defensive statements about independent decisionmaking from opinions during that late 1980's to early 1990's period.

But before focusing on the Guthrie majority opinion itself, let's be clear about a few truisms about our federal system of government in the United States:
  • New York's Court of Appeals (like other state high courts) is NOT an intermediate court in the federal judiciary.
  • Rather, New York's Court of Appeals (like other state high courts) IS the highest court in deciding questions about its own state law.
  • New York's Court of Appeals (like other state high courts) is NOT bound by the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretations of federal law when the Court of Appeals (like other state courts) is deciding the meaning of its own state law.
  • In fact, when it comes to deciding the meaning of New York's (or any other state's) own law, the U.S. Supreme Court has NO authority.
  • Rather, New York's Court of Appeals (like other state high courts) has the INDEPENDENT and ULTIMATE authority to decide the meaning of its own state law, without any consideration of the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of corresponding federal law.
  • New York's Court of Appeals (like other state high courts) must apply the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretations of FEDERAL law--when deciding questions of FEDERAL law.
  • And New York's Court of Appeals (like other state high courts)--when deciding any case--may not actually VIOLATE federal law, such rendering a decision that actually VIOLATES someone's federal constitutional rights or liberties.
  • But, New York's Court of Appeals (like other state high courts) has every right and authority to render decisions under its own STATE law that are DIFFERENT than U.S Supreme Court decisions under federal law.
  • That includes the right and authority of New York's Court of Appeals (like other state high courts) to protect constitutional rights and liberties under its own state law DIFFERENTLY--such as MORE RIGOROUSLY--under its own state law.
  • Yes, New York's Court of Appeals (like other state high courts) is perfectly free to protect constitutional rights and liberties MORE under STATE law than the Supreme Court protects them under federal law.
  • All of the foregoing are ESSENTIAL attributes of our federal form of government under the U.S. Constitution--they are axiomatic, not matters of opinion.
Now what does any of that have to do with the New York court's decision in Guthrie?

Well, it has a great deal to do with it. Specifically, with the implications of the manner in which the Court decided Guthrie. Again, not the ultimate ruling in the case--i.e., that an automobile stop based on a police officer's mistake about the law, if reasonable, is still valid.
(In fact, I have little problem with such a ruling. I do question whether the mistake in Guthrie was one of law at all [see part 4], but the concern here is about something more consequential in the long run than any mischaracterization by the Court of its holding in a single case.]

What all of that does have to do with the Guthrie decision is the Court of Appeals' near-obeisance to the Supreme Court and its decision in Heien. (See part 2 and part 3 for discussions of Heien and its implications.)

Perhaps belaboring the point for emphasis: the Court of Appeals, New York's highest court (like other state high courts), is the highest court in the nation for deciding the meaning of its own state law. That, of course, includes the state's protection of constitutional rights--in Guthrie, search and seizure protections. And yet, the Court of Appeals in Guthrie relied so heavily on the U.S. Supreme Court's Heien decision. It was as though the Supreme Court's decision on federal search and seizure rights was somehow presumptively binding on the Court of Appeals in determining state law.

Let me put it another way. In Guthrie, New York's Court of Appeals, one of the nation's truly fine courts, decided a case about the state's own search and seizure protections largely by echoing whatever the U.S. Supreme Court, a quite mediocre court today, said about federal search and seizure law.

In short, the Court of Appeals majority in Guthrie behaved as if it were an intermediate tribunal in the federal judiciary.

This should be worrisome. Not only because today's Supreme Court is, to be kind, not particularly good; and that the Court of Appeals (like many other state high courts) is so much better. But also because federalism, "dual sovereignty"--the federal-state division of authority--is one of the essential safeguards of our American constitutional governance.

But the Court of Appeals majority in Guthrie seemed almost defensive about that dual sovereignty. About the right and authority (let alone duty) of exercising independent decisionmaking. About reaching a different decision, under state search and seizure protections, than the Supreme Court reached as a matter of federal law.

From its beginning, and certainly through the tenures of Chief Judges such as Benjamin Cardozo, Cuthbert Pound, Irving Lehman and, later, Stanley Fuld, Charles Breitel, and Lawrence Cooke, the Court of Appeals was a--if not the--national leader in recognizing and exercising independent state decisionmaking. More recently, Chief Judge Judith Kaye was in the forefront, both on and off the Court, of emphasizing (and, when necessary, explaining to some of her colleagues) the right and duty of the Court of Appeals, as well as of state high courts generally, of exercising independent judgment in protecting rights and liberties under state law. And with several landmarks under his brief tenure, the current Chief Judge, Jonathan Lippman, has left no doubt that he is part of the Court's storied tradition of independent leadership.

The classic statement of the Court of Appeals' tradition--and, more generally, of the role of state high courts in our federal system of government--was penned by Chief Judge Lehman. In the landmark religious liberty decision in People v. Barber (1943), Lehman, speaking for his unanimous Court, could not have been more clear:
Parenthetically we may point out that in determining the scope and effect of the guarantees of fundamental rights of the individual in the Constitution of the State of New York, this court is bound to exercise its independent judgment and is not bound by a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States limiting the scope of similar guarantees in the Constitution of the United States. [Italics added.]
Twenty years later, then-Judge Fuld--whose state law decisions predated and often influenced Supreme Court rulings--was perhaps even more pointed. In People v. Donovan (1963), protecting self-incrimination and counsel rights as a matter of state constitutional law, he noted:
[W]e find it unnecessary to consider whether or not the Supreme Court of the United States would regard its [the defendant's confession] use a violation of the defendant's rights under the Federal Constitution.
Indeed, Court of Appeals case law throughout the years is teeming with such pronouncements of independent decisionmaking.

Now contrast these, and the tradition they reflect of exercising the right and duty of independent decisionmaking, with the majority opinion in Guthrie. The Court's seeming reluctance in that case to exercise its own judgment about its own state law; its treatment of independent decisionmaking as somehow the exception and of simply adopting the Supreme Court's judgments as the rule; and the underlying misconstruing of the relationship between state and federal law and between the role of the Court of Appeals (and by extension, that of state high courts generally) and that of the Supreme Court--that is what makes the majority opinion in Guthrie so troublesome.

With that in mind, as well as the expressions by Lehman and Fuld of the Court of Appeals' tradition and proper role in our federal system of government, consider what the majority in Gutherie said. Consider how it spoke about the Court's exercise of independent judgment under its own state law, and about the possibility of reaching a different decision than the Supreme Court did under federal law:
[It] would constitute a departure from Heien...We have [] deviated, based on our state constitutional standards, from Supreme Court decisions that undermine our ability to "provide and maintain 'bright line' rules...". More fundamentally, while we have declined to adopt an "ironclad [methodology] to be rigidly applied" in determining whether separate standards are warranted, we have recognized "that we act [] properly in discharging our responsibility to support the State Constitution when we examine whether we should follow . . . as a matter of State law" any recent decision of the Supreme Court that marks a "change[ in] course..."
In Heien, the Supreme Court did not change course.
An independent decision under state law is not a "departure" from federal law. They are two separate bodies of law.
Nor is an independent decision under state law a "deviat[ion]" from a Supreme Court decision. It's a decision interpreting and applying a different body of law.
Nor is it a question about "whether separate standards are warranted." It's about the appropriate standards of protection under the state's own law--whether those standards end up being the same or different than the standards the Supreme Court sets under federal law.
And most certainly, the exercise of independent decisionmaking about one's own state law cannot depend on whether "the Supreme Court [did or] did not change course" in deciding federal law.

The majority's characterization in Guthrie of its decisionmaking about state law--i.e., what protections of constitutional rights and liberties are appropriate under state law, not federal--is a far cry from the historic expressions of the Court of Appeals' tradition and understanding of its proper role.
It is a far cry from: "in determining the scope and effect of the guarantees of fundamental rights of the individual in the Constitution of the State of New York, this court is bound to exercise its independent judgment."
And it is a far cry from: "we find it unnecessary to consider whether or not the Supreme Court of the United States would" protect constitutional rights the same way.

The Guthrie majority's characterization, instead, is a reprise of those overly-defensive justifications for independent decisionmaking employed during that period, the late 1980's and early 1990's--years when the Court was suddenly struggling with some basic concepts of dual sovereignty in our federal system.

The sole dissent in Guthrie by Judge Jenny Rivera criticized the majority for its refusal to adopt an independent standard under state law. A standard separate from the federal one set by the Supreme Court in Heien.

One may or may not agree with Judge Rivera about the ultimate ruling in Guthrie to excuse a police officer's reasonable mistake.
[I have made clear that I agree with the majority on that.]

But it is hard to disagree with Judge Rivera that the majority, in deciding a search and seizure issue under state law in Guthrie, was far too reliant on what the Supreme Court decided about federal law in Heien. That the majority seemed far too tied to the Supreme Court's federal decision. That the majority mischaracterized state constitutional law at the Court of Appeals as requiring some special excuse to "depart" or "deviate" from Supreme Court federal rulings--as opposed to exercising the right and duty to render a judgment that is truly independent under state law.

Let's hope that the Court of Appeals majority in Guthrie didn't actually intend what it certainly seemed to say.
Let's hope that the Court of Appeals majority didn't actually intend to replace the Court's longstanding tradition of truly independent decisionmaking with the overly-defensive justifications employed during a few brief years when the Court seemed to be losing its way.

The New York Court of Appeals is a far better, wiser, more reliable court than the current Supreme Court. Independent decisionmaking under state law is a right and duty that is especially needed today.